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The adoption by one country of another
country’s currency has its place in the history
of the world economy, but had for a long time
fallen out of fashion. This has changed in recent
years, mainly owing to the currency crises faced
by several emerging market economies in the
second half of the 1990s. As eliminating the
exchange rate through the outright adoption of
another currency would eradicate the potential
for a currency crisis, official and unilateral
dollarisation/euroisation has become a common
policy advice.1
In the meantime, five countries or territories
have officially and unilaterally adopted other
countries’ currencies in recent years2: in the
western Balkans, Montenegro and Kosovo
introduced the euro, while in Latin America,
Ecuador and El Salvador set out to abandon
their currencies in favour of the US dollar.
Finally, East Timor effectively dollarised after
gaining independence.
Other countries have considered the adoption of
a foreign currency, with Argentina the most
prominent example.3 In Europe, unilateral
euroisation was recommended to some
countries in the western Balkans and in central
and eastern Europe (Gligorov 2001;
Bratkowski and Rostowski 2001; Begg;
Eichengreen; Halpern; von Hagen; Wyplosz
2001).4 Finally, the pros and cons of a
unilateral adoption of the US dollar or the euro
have been discussed prominently in
international financial institutions and academic
circles, mostly as a result of the emerging
“bipolar” or “corner solution” view on
exchange rate regimes.5
The experience of countries and territories that
have officially and unilaterally adopted a
foreign currency remains under-researched.
While there is a vast literature on policy
implications for countries characterised by a
high degree of unofficial dollarisation/
euroisation,6 the costs and benefits of official
dollarisation/euroisation have mainly been
explored on theoretical grounds (see for
example, the overview provided by Berg and
1 INTRODUCTION
Borensztein 2000). Empirically, the analysis of
official dollarisation has been largely confined
to the case of Panama (Edwards 2001), as most
countries that have adopted another country’s
currency are small and/or dependencies of the
respective anchor countries.7
Cases of dollarisation/euroisation only became
the focus of empirical research when Rose
(2000) provided econometric evidence on the
trade effects of a common currency, suggesting
that two countries sharing a common currency
trade far more with each other than comparable
countries with different currencies. This
research has had a strong impact on the
dollarisation/euroisation debate, as it has been
seen as evidence in favour of the endogeneity
hypothesis of optimum currency areas (OCAs).
According to this hypothesis, the criteria
stressed by the traditional OCA theory are
endogenous, rather than exogenous to the
exchange rate arrangement (Frankel and Rose
1998). Thus, supporters of the endogeneity
hypothesis argue that countries considering
dollarisation/euroisation do not have to meet the
1 For simplicity and in line with standard practice, the term
“dollarisation/euroisation” is used throughout this paper as a
general term for the adoption of a foreign currency. Thus, it is not
only used to characterise cases where the currency adopted is the
US dollar or the euro, but also those cases where other foreign
currencies are involved, e.g. the British pound or the Australian
dollar.
2 For simplicity, we refer to all cases of dollarisation/euroisation as
“countries”. This does not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the authors or the European Central Bank
concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its
authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
3 The abolishment of the peso in favour of the US dollar was openly
discussed in 1999/2000 and in the wake of the currency board crisis
at the end of 2001 (see Edwards 2002).
4 See also the overview in Backé and Wojcik (2003).
5 The Journal of Policy Modelling and the Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking devoted special issues to this subject in 2001. The legal
aspects of this exchange rate regime were discussed at the BIS/
CEMLA/MOCOMILA seminar on the “Legal Implications of
Currency Boards, “Dollarization” and Similar Arrangements”,
held in Mexico City in February 2002.
6 See, for example, the survey provided by Baliño et al. (1999).
Unofficial dollarisation/euroisation is usually measured as the
share of foreign currency deposits in broad money. Bergsten
(1999) uses the terms policy vs. de facto dollarisation instead of
official vs. unofficial dollarisation.
7 Moreover, it is rather difficult to collect relevant data for proper
analysis as many of the cases of dollarisation/euroisation are not
members of the IMF or World Bank, or have only recently
dollarised/euroised.5
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1 INTRODUCTION
OCA criteria ex ante, following a lengthy
process of convergence or integration with the
anchor country before adopting this country’s
currency. Rather, these criteria would
endogenously be fulfilled ex post once a
common currency has been adopted.
This paper adds to the literature in two ways:
first, it provides a comprehensive review of all
the main cases of dollarisation/euroisation. In
particular, it includes all the European cases,
which have so far largely been neglected.
Second, it provides a systematic, theory-based
analysis for each of the main cases. In doing so,
it is guided by three questions:
– Why did countries opt for dollarisation/
euroisation, and did this exchange rate
regime meet their economic needs?
– Do these countries have certain economic
characteristics that distinguish them from
otherwise similar countries which have
maintained currencies of their own?
– Have dollarised/euroised countries pursued
a certain set of policies that may explain their
success in sustaining this exchange rate
regime?
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the literature on dollarisation/
euroisation and provides an overview of the key
criteria to which that literature makes reference
in its discussion of the costs and benefits of this
exchange rate regime. The case study review
has three parts: initially, the focus is on
sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation
(Section 3), which is followed by an analysis of
those cases in which dollarisation/euroisation
was abandoned (Section 4). Finally, recent
Box 1
THE ECB’S POSITION ON UNILATERAL EUROISATION IN ACCESSION COUNTRIES
Although this paper does not deal with hypothetical cases of euroisation, it may be worthwhile
to recall the ECB’s position with regard to potential unilateral euroisation in EU accession
countries.
The ECB considers that the euro area represents a multilateral currency union formed by
Member States of the European Union with common and shared responsibilities among its
members. When forming Monetary Union, the EU Treaty specified certain economic and
institutional criteria that have to be fulfilled by future Member States of the common currency
area in order to safeguard its sustainability. Moreover, the Treaty provides that there has to be
a Community assessment of the fulfilment of these criteria and mutual agreement on the
appropriate exchange rates.
This is why with regard to current and future EU accession countries, the ECB does not
welcome unilateral euroisation, as such an adoption of the euro outside the Treaty process
would run counter to the underlying economic reasoning of European Monetary Union. In
particular, it would undermine the process of convergence prior to the adoption of the euro.
Unilateral euroisation would also imply circumventing the process of multilateral assessment of
new members by current EU Member States and as such would be difficult to reconcile with the
cooperative spirit of a community of fellow members (ECOFIN 2000; Duisenberg 2001;
European Commission 2002).6
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cases of dollarisation/euroisation are discussed
(Section 5).8
The main results, which are summarised in
Section 6, are that policies and attributes –
mainly exogenous to monetary policy – that
foster integration with the anchor country have
been crucial in supporting the exchange rate
regime. To this end, most dollarised/euroised
countries have exploited advantages that are
largely prior to the choice of exchange rate
regime, namely their small size, geographic
proximity to the anchor country, and politically
dependent status.
The findings of the paper suggest
that recommending dollarisation/euroisation
irrespective of countries’ ex ante degree of
integration with the potential anchor country
seems to bear considerable risks, as
dollarisation/euroisation does not seem to be a
straightforward substitute for integration.
Hence, despite its alleged merits as a device for
achieving macroeconomic stability, countries
should carefully consider the option of relying
on a suitable domestic anchor for monetary
policy before opting for unilateral dollarisation/
euroisation (Berg, Borenszstein and Mauro
2002; Detken and Gaspar 2003; Posen 2004).
8 To this end, substantial efforts have been undertaken to collect data
and make them comparable across countries, but question marks
over their reliability remain.7
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The prospective advantages and disadvantages
of unilateral dollarisation/euroisation are
mainly derived from two major theories, the
“bipolar” or “corner solution view” of
sustainable exchange rate regimes, and the
theory of optimum currency areas, which exists
in an “old” and a “new” version. As explained
below, there is significant overlap between the
latter two theories, as the arguments put
forward by the “new” OCA theory, focusing on
the issue of monetary policy credibility, are
similar to the ones stressed in the bipolar view.
These approaches emphasise the response to
externally-induced currency crises, the
credibility of monetary commitments, as well as
assuming limited virtues of monetary policy
discretion, in their evaluation of monetary
regimes largely based on market expectations.
In contrast, the “old” or “traditional” OCA
theory has a rather different focus, as it
emphasises the need for an adjustment
mechanism in case of asymmetric shocks and an
unsatisfactory level of economic integration
between the dollarised/euroised country and its
anchor. In other words, it emphasises more the
real side of integration.
The review of the literature is complemented by
empirical evidence on indicators derived from
these theories, assessing whether countries
would actually qualify as potential candidates
for dollarisation/euroisation. The evidence
indicates that under the bipolar view and the
new OCA theory there might be a substantial
number of countries that could benefit on
stability grounds from unilaterally adopting a
foreign currency. In contrast, the indicators of
the old OCA theory largely suggest that
countries should keep their own domestic
currency, as their level of integration with the
potential anchor country is too low.
1 BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DOLLARISATION/
EUROISATION
Dollarisation/euroisation is defined as the
adoption of the US dollar or the euro by the
authorities of a country outside the United
2 DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION – A REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE
States and the euro area as legal tender and
official currency, implying that the country
chooses to abandon its own currency and the
central bank to forego the monetary policy
instrument.9 There is widespread agreement on
the main benefits and costs of dollarisation/
euroisation, which can be grouped as follows:
A) BENEFITS
Fostering macroeconomic stability:
Dollarisation/euroisation is expected to foster
macroeconomic stability by solving the
credibility problem that arises when a domestic
central bank is unable to pre-commit itself to a
low rate of inflation (Barro and Gordon 1983;
Goldfajn and Olivares 2000). By explicitly
adopting the monetary policy of the issuing
country, which enjoys a high degree of
credibility, inflation and interest rates in the
dollarised/euroised economy are assumed to
converge towards the level of the issuing
country. If this credibility channel works, this
convergence should largely avoid the output
costs associated with disinflation in a low
credibility environment. Moreover,
dollarisation/euroisation is seen as one way to
accept the logic of the “inconsistent quartet”
concept, by relinquishing an independent
monetary policy.10 Finally, dollarisation/
euroisation is supposed to enhance a country’s
fiscal discipline by eliminating the possibility
of printing money to finance fiscal deficits
(Fischer 1982; Eichengreen 2000).
Lower risk premia: If risk premia are owing to
currency and not to country risk, dollarisation/
euroisation should lead to lower risk premia,
because a sharp and sudden devaluation of the
9 Institutional specifications of dollarisation/euroisation regimes can
differ in detail. For example, some countries have maintained their
central bank after dollarising/euroising, while others have
abolished it. Some countries, in particular those that had already
dollarised/euroised back in the 19th or early 20th century, have
never had a central bank. Moreover, some dollarised/euroised
countries still issue domestic coins. However, this merely has a
subsidiary or symbolic role.
10 The concept states that the combination of unrestricted capital
flows, openness to trade, a fixed exchange rate and monetary
policy autonomy is incompatible.8
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domestic currency against the anchor currency
is ruled out  by definition.11 In particular, if a
country is confronted with a currency mismatch
(foreign currency borrowing by public or
private sector entities without major foreign
currency revenues), dollarisation/euroisation
could eliminate this problem and therefore
reduce the sovereign risk.12 Moreover,
assuming well-functioning international capital
markets, dollarisation/euroisation is expected to
improve a country’s access to those markets as
a result of lower currency risks, higher
financial sector stability, lower risk of sudden
introduction of capital controls (Berg and
Borensztein 2000) and lower information costs
(Calvo 1999).
Domestic financial sector development:
Dollarisation/euroisation is expected to support
the development of a country’s financial sector,
because a stable currency is a precondition for
financial development (Hausmann et al. 1999;
Berg and Borensztein 2000), leading to strong
and steady economic growth.13
Elimination of transaction costs:  The
elimination of costs of exchanging the domestic
currency into the currency of the anchor
currency is the most visible effect of
dollarisation/euroisation (Fischer 1982; De
Grauwe 2000), with the cost savings being
proportional to the number of transactions
conducted in foreign currency.
Stronger economic and financial integration:
Dollarisation/euroisation is expected to foster a
country’s economic integration with the
economy of the issuing country (Frankel and
Rose 1998; Rose and Engel 2000a; Dallas and
Tavlas 2001). In particular, trade integration is
likely to deepen owing to lower transaction
costs and the elimination of exchange rate
uncertainty, and under the assumption that trade
is fairly liberalised. As a consequence of higher
economic integration, dollarisation/euroisation
might lead to real convergence in terms of GDP
levels and convergence of business cycles with
the issuing country. Finally, shocks might
become more symmetric between the dollarised/
euroised country and the respective anchor
country, while business cycles might become
more synchronised, in turn further fostering
integration.
B) COSTS
Loss of an adjustment mechanism:  With
dollarisation/euroisation, a country loses the
use of the monetary policy instrument as a
mechanism enabling it to adjust in the wake of
asymmetric shocks and to react to fluctuations
in the business cycle that are not in line with
those in the anchor country. Accordingly, the
dollarised/euroised economy has to rely on
other adjustment mechanisms to avoid
substantial output swings owing to asymmetric
shocks or unsynchronised business cycles with
the issuing country.
Loss of the lender of last resort function: With
dollarisation/euroisation, the domestic
authorities lose the ability to respond to a
sudden run on bank deposits by acting as a
lender of last resort. In particular, the
authorities are unable to inject an unlimited
amount of liquidity into the payment system to
prevent a default on deposits (Berg and
Borensztein 2000), as the amount available to
purchase bank assets and to recapitalise
distressed financial institutions is restricted to
the country’s stock of foreign reserves.
Loss of seigniorage: The most direct cost of
unilateral dollarisation/euroisation is the loss of
seigniorage revenues from issuing a domestic
currency, as these revenues will shift from the
domestic monetary authority to the monetary
11 However, if the loss of the exchange rate instrument diminishes a
country’s adjustment capacity to asymmetric shocks, dollarisation/
euroisation could increase default risk, thus contributing to higher
risk premia (Goldfajn and Olivares 2000).
12 See Calvo (1999, 2001) and Hausmann (1999). Of course,
dollarisation/euroisation does not preclude sovereign defaults
resulting from an unsustainable fiscal position, unsound financial
systems or political turmoil.
13 The positive correlation between financial development and
economic growth has been studied intensively over the last few
years. For a comprehensive survey of the evidence, see World
Bank (2001).9
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COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION FOR COUNTRIES ISSUING A CURRENCY
ADOPTED BY OTHER COUNTRIES
Most of the debate on dollarisation/euroisation has focused on the question of whether it is
desirable for the country adopting the foreign currency, whereas less attention has been paid to
the question of dollarisation/euroisation from the perspective of the issuing country. This may
be explained by the fact that most costs and benefits for countries adopting the foreign currency
appear to be readily transferable to the case of issuing countries (Altig 2002). For example, if
dollarisation/euroisation facilitates trade and this leads to a higher degree of monetary and
financial stability in the newly dollarised/euroised economy, then this might also benefit the
issuing country. Conversely, if the loss of the monetary policy instrument in the dollarised/
euroised economy has negative effects on stability and growth in the dollarised/euroised
economy, there might be negative repercussions on the anchor country as well.
A readily measurable benefit of dollarisation/euroisation for the issuing country would be
seigniorage gains that correspond to the loss of seigniorage revenues for the dollarised/euroised
economy, although these gains are likely to be relatively small.a) In cases of widespread
unofficial dollarisation/euroisation in the form of currency substitution, the marginal gains
would be even lower (Altig 2002).
The main costs for countries issuing the foreign currency to be adopted are related to the
possibility that in the event of a crisis in the dollarised/euroised economy, there will be
pressures on the issuing central bank to accommodate shocks, even if there are no formal
obligations to do so (Altig 2002, Alesina and Barro 2001a, Summers 1999).b) Finally,
dollarisation/euroisation of third countries is less appealing to the issuing country when
countries considering this exchange rate regime have a history of high monetary instability
(Bayoumi and Mauro 2001), as this might have negative reputation effects on the issuing
country and its central bank.
a) Altig (2002) estimates the seigniorage gains (“flow” gains) for the United States to be
between 0.2 and 0.8% of GDP per year if Mexico and the countries of South America were
to adopt the US dollar as their domestic currency.
b) The same pressure may arise with regard to the lender of last resort function (Schuler and
Stein 2000).
authority of the issuing country.14 The loss of
seigniorage includes both one-off “stock” costs
arising from replacing the national currency in
circulation with foreign banknotes and coins,
and “flow” costs arising from the loss of the
future earnings stemming from the flow of new
currency printed every year.
14 In principle, countries could agree to share seigniorage revenues.
However, the only such arrangement that currently exists is
between Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa.
C) FACTORS AFFECTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN
BENEFITS AND COSTS
The most readily quantifiable benefits and costs
of dollarisation/euroisation are the potential
transaction cost savings and the loss of
seigniorage revenues.10
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The potential for transaction cost savings as a
result of the adoption of a foreign currency
depends on the degree of trade openness of the
respective economy and the share of trade that
is invoiced in the foreign currency adopted.15 It
is a well-documented stylised fact that in
general small countries exhibit a higher level of
openness – as measured by the ratio of the sum
of exports and imports to GDP – than larger
economies,16 indicating that transaction cost
savings may benefit them the most. In general,
however, transaction cost savings per se are not
perceived as a major point in favour of
dollarisation/euroisation.17 Rather, the
argument relies on trade-enhancing effects
triggered by a reduction in transaction costs and
the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty.
Costs related to the loss of seigniorage
revenues are considered to be significant for
many emerging market economies, particularly
for those with large informal sectors, an
underdeveloped tax system and/or high
inflation.18 However, a developed tax system
and monetary stability are regarded as general
policy goals irrespective of the exchange rate
regime. Thus, the proper benchmark for
dollarisation/euroisation costs related to the
loss of seigniorage revenues seems to be a
situation of monetary stability. Most empirical
studies focusing on countries that issue a stable
currency put these costs at around or below 1%
of GDP (Klein and Neumann 1990, De Grauwe
2000, Schobert 2002).
In summary, neither transaction cost savings
nor the loss of seigniorage revenues are at the
centre of the dollarisation/euroisation debate.
Instead, the discussion on the benefits and costs
of dollarisation/euroisation focuses on the
usefulness of domestic monetary policy as an
adjustment instrument in the face of asymmetric
shocks.
2 DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION AND THE
BIPOLAR VIEW ON SUSTAINABLE EXCHANGE
RATE REGIMES
The increasing incidence and intensity of
currency crises in the 1990s gave new impetus
to the debate on the sustainability of exchange
rate regimes. At the end of the decade
consensus seemed to emerge19 whereby, under
conditions of an increasingly open capital
account, soft pegs – the exchange rate regime
that was most widely used by emerging market
economies – are seen as unsustainable. Hence,
countries that have an open capital account or
plan to liberalise capital flows should choose in
favour of one of the two “corner solutions” –
either flexible exchange rates or hard pegs,
such as currency boards or dollarisation/
euroisation.20
15 In most cases, data on the use of currencies for international trade
settlement and invoicing in goods and services are not available.
However, there are estimates putting the share of world trade
invoiced in US dollars at 50% (McDonough 1997), which is much
higher than the United States’ share of world exports. One reason
for this discrepancy is related to the fact that energy and raw
materials are internationally priced in US dollars. While the
existence of international pricing standards does not preclude, by
itself, the use of another currency for invoicing and settlement,
trade in energy and materials is almost exclusively invoiced and
settled in US dollars.
16 See, for example, Easterly and Kray (2000). From a regional point
of view, Asian countries are the most open economies, whereas
trade, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is lowest in Latin
American countries.
17 In the case of the highly integrated EU economies, the transaction
cost savings of the single currency were estimated to represent a
quarter to half a percent of EU GDP per annum (De Grauwe 2000;
EC 1990).
18 There are different ways of calculating seigniorage revenues
(Klein and Neumann 1990). Estimates for seven Latin American
countries put the potential stock costs of dollarisation at around
4.5% of GDP (in the period from 1991 to 1997), whereas potential
flow costs were estimated on average at 2.3% of GDP. Costs varied
substantially from country to country depending on the country’s
inflation rate, and its degree of financial development and
unofficial dollarisation (Bogetic 1999). Moreover, in many high
inflation economies, monetary instability encouraged widespread
currency and asset substitution, thereby severely limiting the
opportunities for exploiting seigniorage on a sustainable basis
(Schobert 2002).
19 See Frankel (1999), the International Financial Institution Advisory
Commission (2000) and Fischer (2001a).
20 The collapse of Argentina’s currency board has reopened this
debate, as it raises questions about the practical relevance of the
“two corner” approach to exchange rate policy (Edwards 2002;
ECB 2003).11
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High (> 70%) Bolivia, Uruguay, Lebanon
Middle (> 20 %, < 70%) Cambodia, Bulgaria, Belarus,
Angola, Costa Rica, Russia,





Turkey, São Tomé & Príncipe, Moldova,
Paraguay, Azerbaijan, Honduras,
Romania, Latvia, Ukraine,
Guinea-Bissau, Congo, DR Yemen
Armenia
Table 2.1 Unofficial dollarisation/euroisation in selected countries
Source: Honohan and Shi (2002).
1) Expressed as a share of foreign currency deposits in broad money. Honohan and Shi present data for the years 1990-2000, whenever
they are available. Note that Ecuador switched to unilateral, official dollarisation in 2000 (see Section 5). The breakdown into high and
middle unofficially dollarised countries is taken from the World Bank’s ”dollarisation” webpage.
2) In most countries, the US dollar is the main currency in which foreign exchange deposits are denominated. Only in some countries
neighbouring the EU, in particular in the countries of former Yugoslavia, such as Croatia, are foreign exchange deposits widely
denominated in euro (ECB 2002).
The choice of the proper exchange rate regime is
perceived to depend largely on the credibility of
domestic monetary policy.21 This is because
countries with a low degree of monetary policy
credibility are severely limited in their capacity
to use monetary policy so as to reduce output
fluctuations (Summers 2000; Calvo and
Reinhart 2001)22 or to act as an effective lender
of last resort.23 Thus, they cannot benefit from
the gains a floating exchange rate is associated
with. The experience of many emerging market
economies even suggests that the use of
domestic monetary policy might have had
destabilising effects in terms of interest and
exchange rate volatility (Del Negro et al. 2001),
amplifying rather than mitigating
macroeconomic fluctuations and financial
instability.24
Conversely, the adoption of a foreign currency
offers countries with low credibility a strong
“commitment device” (Del Negro et al. 2001)
that they can use to stabilise monetary and
economic conditions, allowing for lower
interest rates, supporting non-inflationary
growth and fostering financial development.
Thus, dollarisation/euroisation is regarded as a
key policy tool that can put emerging markets
on the road to monetary and financial stability
(Calvo 2001).25
The recent popularity of dollarisation/
euroisation can be partly explained by the fact
that many developing countries and emerging
market economies can be, or have been,
21 A different point against floating exchange rates is that emerging
market countries tend to export commodities and/or light
manufactures, making them more vulnerable to high exchange rate
volatility (Edwards 2002).
22 For example, in a country with a high degree of unofficial
dollarisation/euroisation indicating a lack of monetary policy
credibility, adjusting the exchange rate may be of little use, as many
wages and prices are tied to a foreign currency. In this case, they
will rise or fall by the same amount as the exchange rate (Frankel
1999). See, however, Cordon (2000) and Broda (2001), who argue
that the real effects of exchange rate devaluations on output and
employment are empirically significant, at least for larger
countries.
23 The limits of monetary policy in acting as a lender of last resort in
the case of a high degree of unofficial dollarisation/euroisation are
spelled out in Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001).
24 This holds in particular under conditions of increasing international
capital market integration.
25 This does not mean, however, that dollarisation/euroisation is seen
as a tool for stabilising business cycle fluctuations. On the contrary,
it ensures that countries cannot pursue classical stabilisation
policies they would be incapable of implementing effectively
owing to credibility problems.12
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characterised by a low degree of monetary
policy credibility owing to long periods of high
inflation. Moreover, many of them seem to have
failed in implementing more orthodox measures
regaining credibility.
A particularly relevant measure of the lack of
monetary policy credibility is the degree of
unofficial dollarisation/euroisation, defined as
the share of foreign currency deposits in broad
money, as it reflects the response of private
agents to currency instability, macroeconomic
mismanagement and financial crises. Table 2.1
provides evidence, collected by Honohan and
Shi (2002), that shares of foreign currency
deposits in broad money of more than 20% is
not a rare phenomenon, but can be observed in
many countries. Thus, the evidence seems to
suggest that under the bipolar or corner solution
view, there would be a substantial number of
countries that meet a key prerequisite for
becoming a candidate for dollarisation/
euroisation.
3 DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION AND OPTIMUM
CURRENCY AREAS
Dollarisation/euroisation not only constitutes
an exchange rate regime, but also implies a
unilateral link to an existing currency area.
Thus, the dollarisation/euroisation debate
echoes arguments put forward in the OCA
literature. Indeed, the view that dollarisation/
euroisation represents a sustainable and
appropriate exchange rate regime for countries
with low domestic monetary policy credibility
has much in common with the “new” view on
OCAs. This view, developed in the 1980s and
early 1990s, is based on (1) the proposition of
the long-run ineffectiveness of monetary
policy, (2) the credibility issue, and (3) doubts
as to the effectiveness of exchange rate
adjustments (Mongelli 2002). Since low
credibility implies low effectiveness of
monetary policy and nominal exchange rate
changes even in the short run, the cost of losing
the monetary policy instrument is negligible in
this view. At the same time, the benefits in
terms of credibility and stability gains are
potentially high. Hence, as in the sustainable
exchange rate regime literature, countries with
low monetary policy credibility are considered
prime candidates for joining another currency
area by unilaterally switching to dollarisation/
euroisation.
Whereas the new view on OCAs stresses the
benefits to stability, the old view highlights the
integration prerequisites of dollarisation/
euroisation. This is because the cost-benefit
analysis of the old OCA theory does not focus
on whether a country can use monetary policy
effectively to cope with asymmetric shocks and
unsynchronised business cycles. Rather, it
raises the question whether such a policy is
needed. Thus, under the old view, the pros and
cons of dollarisation/euroisation are not
assessed by analysing the effectiveness of
domestic monetary policy, but rather by
evaluating the effectiveness of other adjustment
mechanisms and the level of economic
integration (see Table 2.2).
The most important adjustment mechanisms that
could substitute for monetary policy are price
and wage flexibility as well as mobility of
factors of production, whereas the degree of
diversification in production and consumption
is a good indicator for assessing the adjustment
capacities and needs of the respective
economies. Fiscal and political integration with
the anchor country could represent an
alternative as well, acting as a shock absorber.
Finally, a high degree of trade and financial
Table 2.2 Properties of optimum currency
areas – the “old” view
OCA properties allowing countries to forego monetary policy as an
adjustment instrument
• Price and wage flexibility
• Mobility of factors of production
• Diversification in production and consumption
• Fiscal and political integration
• Openness and trade integration
• Financial market integration
• Business cycle correlation
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Mongelli (2002).13
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Chart 2.1 Net remittances
(as a percent of imports, average 1995-2000)
Sources: IMF, authors’ calculations.
Note: The chart shows all countries where data are available and
have a value > 4%.
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integration would lessen the need for any
adjustment mechanism by lowering the
probability of asymmetric shocks, leading to a
highly correlated business cycle.
In the following, these issues will be briefly
discussed, providing some empirical evidence
on indicators that try to capture the availability
of and need for these alternative adjustment
mechanisms. The main finding is that most
indicators suggest that only a few countries
might afford to surrender domestic monetary
policy.
PRICE AND WAGE RIGIDITIES
Price and wage rigidities, in industrialised as
well as in developing countries, seem to be
widespread. Indeed, if prices and wages were to
behave in a textbook-like flexible price world,
the issue of an optimum currency area, either in
its old or new version, would be of little
relevance (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996).
MOBILITY OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
In general, inter-regional mobility of labour is
rather limited (Mongelli 2002, Bayoumi and
Mauro 2001, World Bank 1995). However,
there are exceptions. Data on migration and
remittance flows suggest that a rather large
share of the population of some developing and
emerging market countries is working abroad,
mainly in the US, the EU26 and oil-producing
countries in the Gulf region. Indeed,
remittances have become an important source of
external funding (World Bank 2003) for some
small countries in the geographical vicinity of
these three economic areas. Evidence from
those countries for which data are available
suggests that there are several countries
financing more than one-fifth of total imports
by means of remittances (see Chart 2.1).
DIVERSIFICATION OF PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION
A high concentration of exports in specific
categories of goods and services is considered
to be an argument in favour of flexible exchange
rates, i.e. against dollarisation/euroisation,
assuming that the potential anchor country is
not specialised in the same kind of production.
Available evidence suggests that many
countries are characterised by a high degree of
concentration in production and exports
(Cashin, Céspedes and Sahay 2002). For
example, a modified version of the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index suggests that the
concentration of exports is highest for
resource-rich countries, such as the oil-
producing states in Africa, the Middle East and
the CIS, and for some small countries.27
FISCAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION
Political integration with sizeable fiscal
implications is a rare phenomenon, with the
exception of political dependencies (see Section
26 For a recent analysis of migration flows in Europe, see Brücker
(2002).
27 The index, calculated by UNCTAD, has a value of 1 when a single
export product produces all export revenues. Conversely, when
export revenues are evenly distributed over a large number of
products, the index approaches 0. In total, 65 of the 150 countries
in the UNCTAD sample feature an index value larger than 0.3,
while 36 countries have a value larger than 0.5, indicating that the
export structure is rather concentrated.14
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3.5.3). In the case of the European Union, fiscal
transfers among Member States amount to less
than 1% of GDP. However, many developing
countries receive bilateral and multilateral aid
that can be interpreted as a kind of fiscal
transfer from the international community.
Although development aid is not granted with
the aim of acting as a shock absorber, it might
represent a potential link with the anchor
country that, in some circumstances, is
available to offset the impact of shocks and can
therefore add to the sustainability of the
exchange rate regime. For some countries, these
flows of official development assistance (ODA)
constitute a significant share of Gross National
Income (GNI). World Bank data reveal that 75
countries received ODA flows amounting on
average to more than 5% of GNI in the period
1990-1999.
TRADE AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Available evidence suggests that with regard to
trade in goods, pre-EMU Europe achieved the
highest level of regional integration among
independent countries (see Table 2.3). Only in
Europe does intra-regional trade in goods
account for the largest share in total trade and,
at the same time, feature strongly in terms of
intra-regional GDP. Intra-regional trade of
ASEAN countries, which are more open in
general, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is
slightly higher than in the euro area. However,
the share of ASEAN intra-regional trade in total
trade is rather low (Bayoumi and Mauro 2001).
The opposite is true for NAFTA countries:
while these are rather closed economies,
Measures on intra-regional trade in goods
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Region % of total trade % of total trade % of regional GDP % of regional GDP
Euro area 45.9 45.0 12.0 11.0
NAFTA 55.3 43.5 5.4 5.5
ASEAN-5 19.3 19.3 14.3 11.7
Mercosur 25.0 21.4 1.8 2.0
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 8.0 8.1 2.9 2.4
Table 2.3 Intra-regional trade in goods, 19981)
Sources: IMF, own calculations.
1) Intra-regional trade: exports/imports of the member countries to/from each other.
NAFTA intra-regional trade accounted for
about half of total trade. On both counts, trade
integration is much lower among Mercosur and
GCC countries.28
Turning to trade integration with the US and the
EU, the evidence suggests that on average
countries show a higher degree of trade
integration with the EU than with the US.
However, there is a strong regional pattern.
Among the countries exhibiting a large degree
of trade integration with the EU are all the
acceding and accession countries, the non-EU
countries of western Europe, Norway, Iceland
and Switzerland, and most other countries
belonging to the “Euro Time Zone” (Mazzaferro
et al. 2002). Countries characterised by a high
degree of trade integration with the US are
mainly located in the Western Hemisphere.
Turning to financial integration, the 1990s saw
a steep rise in international capital flows.
Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that
long-run co-movements of financial prices have
become quite significant across countries.29
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
increased as well, increasing globally from
about USD 200 billion in 1990 to roughly USD
1,500 billion in 2000. The bulk of financial
cross-border flows have remained within
industrialised countries (IMF 2001d),
28 For a general overview of trade integration across regions, see IMF
(2002).
29 See the review of the evidence on financial integration in
developed countries provided by Mongelli (2002).15
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reflecting the relative stability of the
institutional environment in these countries
(IMF 2002). Moreover, developed economies
are still characterised by a home bias, as
financial market integration continues to be
significantly larger within countries than
between countries (IMF 2002).
BUSINESS CYCLE CORRELATION
Empirical evidence on world business cycles
suggests that business cycle correlation for
industrial countries is significantly higher than
for developing countries or between developing
and industrial countries (Calderón, Chong and
Stein 2002; Barro 2001). This result seems to
reflect evidence on other OCA properties.
Recent research indicates that a higher degree of
trade and financial openness corresponds to a
higher degree of business cycle correlation.
Trade specialisation may also be an important
factor, as business cycles of economies with
similar structures are – ceteris paribus – more
correlated than business cycles of economies
with different economic structures (Imbs 2003).
Thus, to a large extent business cycle
correlation seems to reflect developments in
trade and financial integration as well as trade
diversification.
4 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK: STABILITY AND
INTEGRATION AS KEY ISSUES IN ANALYSING
THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION
Stability and integration are the two main
approaches adopted in this paper to analyse the
current cases of dollarisation/euroisation and
their policy implications. These two concepts
capture the essence of the policy issues
included in this specific monetary regime: on
the one hand, dollarisation/euroisation is seen,
from a stability point of view, as a tool to
eliminate a credibility problem and therefore to
enhance macroeconomic and financial stability.
On the other hand, from an integration point of
view, dollarisation/euroisation is importantly
linked to the degree of economic and financial
(and often also institutional) integration with
the anchor country. Here, some call for ex ante
integration to ensure sustainability, while
others argue for ex post integration, relying on
endogenous integration tendencies related to the
adoption of the foreign currency.
These considerations explain why, despite
broad agreement on the potential costs and
benefits of dollarisation/euroisation, the
literature is far from conclusive.30 This relates
in particular to cases where – from a stability
perspective – countries face difficulties in
making efficient use of domestic monetary
policy owing to a lack of credibility, but –
according to the integration point of view –still
need domestic monetary policy as an adjustment
tool to use in the wake of asymmetric shocks
(see Overview 2.1). Empirically, these cases are
quite relevant as there are a number of countries
that seem to be suffering from a lack of
monetary policy credibility owing to a history
of monetary instability and a high degree of
unofficial dollarisation/euroisation. But, more
often than not, the very same countries seem to
need domestic monetary policy since other
adjustment mechanisms are not available and
because they lack a sufficient degree of
integration with the potential anchor country.
Rather, they are characterised by a low degree
of price and wage flexibility and feature a high
degree of export product concentration. Factor
mobility might have increased for some
countries, as indicated by a rise in remittances.
Most countries do not at any rate have the
perspective of a political integration process
with potential anchor countries, such as the US
or the EU. And although some countries can
count on substantial transfers from the
international community in terms of official
development assistance, this cannot necessarily
be interpreted as an adjustment tool. Finally,
most countries, in particular larger ones, are
rather closed economies and lack a high degree
of real and financial integration with the
potential anchor countries.
30 See also Del Negro et al. (2001), who in a concluding paragraph
summarise several papers on the pros and cons of dollarisation.16
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Thus, applying economic criteria may often lead
to contradictory conclusions regarding the cost
and benefits of a possible move towards
dollarisation/euroisation for individual
countries.31 The following sections examine in
detail cases where individual countries opted
for dollarisation/euroisation.
31 Argentina is a classic example of this (Frankel 1999). An analysis
for Latin America as a whole can be found in Berg, Borensztein and
Mauro (2002).
Sustainable exchange rate regime debate “Old” view on OCAs
and ”new” view on OCAs
Value of having domestic monetary • Monetary policy lacks credibility • Other adjustment mechanisms are
policy at one’s disposal is low if available
• There is no need for an adjustment mechanism
(symmetric shocks, synchronised business cycles)
Indicators used to assess the value of • Inflation rate • Price and wage flexibility
monetary policy • Degree of unofficial • Factor mobility
dollarisation/euroisation • Diversification of production structure
• Fiscal and political integration
• Openness and trade integration
• Financial integration
Support for dollarisation/ Strong, as many countries seem to be Weak, as many countries seem to need an
euroisation characterised by a low degree of monetary adjustment mechanism and there is  only limited
policy credibility and a high ability to ability to substitute convergence for domestic
converge to an anchor country’s price  monetary policy as an adjustment tool
movements
Overview 2.1 The dollarisation/euroisation debate
Source: Authors’ compilation.17
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On the basis of the list of territories published
by the United Nations32 it is possible to identify
51 cases of sustained official dollarisation/
euroisation. Most of them are small, many even
involving a population of less than 100,000.
Moreover, almost two-thirds of the territories
are politically dependent. While the degree of
dependency and the status under international
law varies, the term “countries” is, as already
mentioned, used to cover both dependent and
independent territories for the sake of
simplicity.33 Only where the distinction
between independent countries and political
dependencies appears to have an economic
bearing or implications related to the OCA
criteria will we distinguish between countries
and other territories.
Information on the economic performance of
dollarisation/euroisation cases has, owing to a
lack of data, been limited. However, when Rose
and various co-authors (e.g. Rose 2000 and
2001, Rose and Engel 2000a, 2000b, Glick and
Rose 2001) provided econometric evidence on
the large trade effects of a common currency,
the sample of countries with a common currency
included many of these cases. The feature that
has attracted the most attention is that the
results of these studies suggest that
dollarisation/euroisation could be a sustainable
exchange rate regime even if integration with
the potential anchor country is rather low ex
ante, as it might endogenously increase ex post.
This claim, which depends on the specific
attributes of small and microstates, merits
further scrutiny.
The following sections present an overview of
the current cases of dollarisation/euroisation
and the evidence in Rose et al. The subsequent
sections review in detail their economic
performance, searching for common,
economically relevant features that might have
contributed to the sustainability of the exchange
rate regime. The focus is initially on six
independent countries that have been dollarised/
euroised for quite some time, namely the five
European microstates and Panama. After a
broad  analysis of the remaining cases, a final
3 CASES OF SUSTAINED DOLLARISATION/
EUROISATION
section summarises the results and derives
some policy lessons.
1 OVERVIEW OF CASES
Of the 51 identified cases of sustained official
dollarisation/euroisation (see Table 3.1), 15 use
the US dollar, and 13 the euro. Other currencies
used are the South African rand, the Australian
dollar, the Danish krone, the New Zealand
dollar, the Swiss franc, the British pound and
the Indian rupee.34 Some countries do formally
have their own currency, such as the Bahamas,
Barbados, Bermuda, Belize, Bhutan, Lesotho or
Namibia,35 but as they have been pegged to the
respective anchor currency for such a long time
and/or are used interchangeably with the anchor
currency, they can be safely considered as being
dollarised/euroised.36
The sample of dollarised/euroised countries has
several special characteristics:
– Most of the countries are very small. In total,
the 51 countries account for a population of
roughly 18.5 million people. Only seven of
them have a population larger than 1 million.
– In the sample there are 31 politically-
dependent territories, usually dependencies
or overseas territories of the respective
anchor countries. Of the 20 independent
countries in the sample, 13 only became
independent between the late 1960s and the
early 1990s.
32 See www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/geoname.pdf.
33 Again, this does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever
on the part of the authors or the European Central Bank on the legal
status of any country, area or territory or its authorities, or
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
34 See also Rose (2000).
35 British dependencies officially use the pound with a reference to the
dependencies’ name, i.e. St. Helena pound, whereas French
Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna use the CFP
franc.
36 Schuler and Stein (2000) characterise these cases as “semi-
officially dollarised”. On the other hand, Hawkins (2003) calls the
monetary arrangement in Bermuda, the Faeroes, the Falklands
Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Lesotho,
Namibia and St. Helena a currency board.18
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– With the exception of the island countries in
the North Pacific, all independent countries
use the currency of an anchor country either
in their geographical vicinity or with whom
they share a common border. Hence, for
these countries, dollarisation/euroisation has
a regional dimension. Only dependent
territories use the currencies of their home
countries however distant they are.
2 THE ENDOGENEITY THESIS AND THE ROSE
EVIDENCE
The case of dollarisation/euroisation attracted
attention with the publication of a series of
papers by Rose and various co-authors on the
Euroised countries Population Dollarised countries Population Other cases of official Population
(dependent territories) (dependent territories) foreign currency adoption
(dependent territories)
Reunion 732,570 Puerto Rico 3,937,316 Jersey (GBP) 89,361
Guadeloupe 431,170 Guam 157,557 Isle of Man (GBP) 73,489
Martinique 418,454 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 122,211 Guernsey (GBP) 64,342
French Polynesia 253,506 Northern Mariana Is. 74,612 Greenland (DKK) 56,352
New Caledonia 204,863 American Samoa 67,084 The Faroes (DKK) 45,661
French Guiana 177,562 Bermuda 63,503 Gibraltar (GBP) 27,649
Mayotte 163,366 British Virgin Is. 20,812 Cook Islands (NZD) 20,611
Wallis and Futuna 15,435 Turks and Caicos Is. 18,122 St. Helena (GBP) 7,266
St. Pierre and Miquelon 6,928 Falkland Is. (GBP) 2,895
Christmas Is. (AUD) 2,771
Norfolk Is. (AUD) 1,879
Tokelau (NZD) 1,445
Cocos Is. (AUD) 633
Pitcairn Is. (NZD) 47
Total 2,403,854 Total 4,443,095 Total 394,401
Independent euroised Population Independent dollarised Population Independent countries that Population
countries (date of countries (date of have adopted another
independence) independence) foreign currency (date of
independence, currency
adopted)
Andorra (1278) 67,627 Panama (1903) 2,845,647 Lesotho (1966, ZAR) 2,177,062
Monaco (1419) 31,842 Bahamas (1973) 297,852 Bhutan (1949, INR) 2,049,412
San Marino (301) 27,336 Barbados (1966) 275,330 Namibia (1990, ZAR) 1,797,677
Vatican City (1929) 890 Belize (1981) 256,062 Swaziland (1968, ZAR) 1,104,343
Micronesia, Fed. States (1986) 134,597 Kiribati (1979, AUD) 94,149
Marshall Islands (1986) 70,882 Liechtenstein (1806, CHF) 32,528
Palau (1994) 19,092 Nauru (1968, AUD) 12,088
Tuvalu (1978, AUD) 10,991
Niue (1974, NZD) 2,124
Total 127,695 Total 3,899,462 Total 7,280,374
Table 3.1 Sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation
Sources: CIA World Fact Book, authors’ compilation.
endogenous trade effects of a common
currency. Using a sample of currency unions
that includes 22 cases listed in Table 3.1,37 Rose
and co-authors estimate a standard gravity
model of bilateral trade based on extensive
cross-country panel data. The model includes
income and distance variables, controlling for
other variables potentially affecting trade
flows, such as a free trade area, a common
border, language, colonial past, size,
landlocked countries, islands, etc. Finally, a
37 The CFA franc zone countries, the countries of the East Caribbean
Currency Area (ECCA) and the respective anchor countries are
among the 56 countries that constitute the group of countries
sharing a common currency in Rose’s analysis.19
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dummy variable is included in the regressions,
which is equal to unity when a country pair is a
currency union, and zero otherwise.
The result suggests that two countries sharing a
common currency trade far more, perhaps over
three times as much, than comparable countries
with different currencies.38 This finding has
proven to be statistically significant and robust
with regard to other variables potentially
affecting trade flows. The impact on the
dollarisation/euroisation debate has been strong,
as the level of trade integration needed to secure
the benefits of stability in the medium and long
term might be an endogenous variable.39 Thus,
the result supports the “endogeneity thesis”
(Frankel and Rose 1998; Dallas and Tavlas
2001), turning the old OCA view on its head: the
traditional OCA properties should thus be seen
as a consequence, and not as a prerequisite, of
adopting a common currency.
The Rose results triggered a debate on several
aspects. Methodological issues and questions
of data reliability were raised by Nitsch (2002)
and by Persson (2002).40 Other observers
wondered whether the results can be
generalised (Quah 2000; Obstfeld 2000;
Masson 2000), given the special characteristics
of many dollarised/euroised countries.41
Studies on other economic characteristics of
sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation
followed. Most prominently, Edwards (2001)
and Edwards and Magendzo (2001, 2002) –
analysing the macroeconomic performance of
Panama and 13 other cases listed in Table 3.142
– found that dollarised/euroised countries have
experienced significantly lower inflation, but
have also grown at a significantly lower rate
than countries with their own currencies.43
Moreover, fiscal records of the two groups of
countries are rather similar. Overall, this line of
research seems to suggest that the adoption of a
foreign currency does not automatically ensure
a good, let alone superior, macroeconomic
performance (Backé and Wojcik 2003).
The debate suggests that the policy issues
raised by dollarisation/euroisation cannot be
answered by only referring to the possible trade
effects of a common currency. Even if they are
large, they might not be sufficient to ensure the
benefits of an exchange rate regime.44 In
addition, a broader analysis might reveal that
other adjustment mechanisms – not captured in
the trade regressions – had come into play,
supporting the sustainability of the exchange
rate regime in those instances where
dollarisation/euroisation was maintained.45 It
remains possible that a high degree of trade
integration between members of a common
currency area might emerge as a result of other
policies or country-specific factors beyond
those controlled for in the Rose regressions,
rather than the common currency itself. For
these reasons, we examine case studies of the
examples of sustained dollarisation/euroisation
as well as of those few countries which have
exited such a regime (see Section 4). Thus, the
following analysis does not pretend at drawing
final conclusions, but rather aims at providing
an overview of the key economic characteristics
and economic policies of this set of countries.
38 Earlier research had largely failed to identify a significant and
positive effect of exchange rate stability on trade.
39 For example, Glick and Rose (2001) claim that joining a currency
union may cause bilateral trade to almost double. Frankel and Rose
(2002), explicitly referring to dollarisation/euroisation, suggest
that this exchange rate regime might be associated with both
enhanced economic integration and also higher economic growth.
40 See also the response by Rose (2002).
41 Some countries in the Rose sample represent members of a
regional, multilateral currency arrangement, such as the countries
of the CFA franc zone and the ECCA. Klein (2002) argues that by
confining the analysis to cases of unilateral dollarisation/
euroisation, for example examining the United States’ bilateral
trade with countries that have entered into a currency union with
the United States, it is much more difficult to find significant trade
effects.
42 Andorra, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Monaco, Nauru, Panama, San Marino, Tuvalu, the Cook Islands,
Greenland and Puerto Rico. In addition, Liberia and Palau were
included.
43 Edwards and Magendzo (2002) claim that it is the performance of
the ECCA countries which led to the econometric result in Frankel
and Rose (2002) that currency union members grow at a faster rate
than countries with a domestic currency.
44 Glick and Rose (2001) point out that the trade effects of a common
currency may take some time.
45 Lockwood (2000) raises the question whether the Rose results
actually support the old view of OCAs, indicating that the formation
of currency unions may be endogenous to trade flows.20
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3 THE EUROPEAN MICROSTATES
3.1BASIC FACTS
In Europe, five countries, which can be
subsumed under the heading “European
microstates”, adopted a foreign currency as
early as the 19th or early 20th century: Andorra,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the
Vatican City. On 1 January 1999, three of these
(San Marino, the Vatican City and Monaco)
became officially euroised.46 Moreover, as the
EU Treaty legally entitles these countries to use
the euro as their official currency, based on
agreements between these three countries and
France and Italy respectively, these cases do not
reflect unilateral euroisation in the literal sense.
By contrast, there is no legal arrangement
between the European Community and Andorra
regarding the use of the euro in Andorra, nor
was there one in the past between Andorra and
France or Spain regarding the use of the French
franc and the Spanish peseta. Nevertheless, in
October 2000 Andorra adopted a law officially
introducing the euro in Andorra. Finally,
Liechtenstein unilaterally adopted the Swiss
franc as legal tender in 1924, after its economy
had suffered considerable damage from the
erosion of Austria’s one-time currency, the
crown, and the failures of several attempts to
create a national currency (Klauser 2001).47
For many years, the European microstates had
no institution performing central bank
functions. This changed in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when some established institutions
for treasury and tax collection purposes, to
supervise the banking system, to administer
required reserves, and to manage financial
relations and transactions with foreign
counterparties.
3.2ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE
LONG RUN48
The European microstates have reached income
levels as high as or higher than the countries
whose currency they have adopted. This is a
major achievement given that economic
conditions in these countries were rather poor
before World War II.49 Their rapid post-war
development has been almost exclusively based
on tourism and banking. Tourism and the hotel
sector account for almost 35% of total
employment in Andorra, while the financial
centre accounts for approximately one-third of
real net output in Liechtenstein (Klauser 2001)
and for roughly 20% of global turnover in
Monaco.
3.3OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA PROPERTIES
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
The new OCA theory suggests several
indicators for evaluating the appropriateness of
dollarisation/euroisation for individual
countries. In the following sections on
sustained, abandoned and recent cases of
dollarisation/euroisation, the focus will be on
whether the alleged increase in credibility has
been accompanied by low(er) inflation, interest
rates and bond spreads as well as by smaller
fiscal and current account imbalances.
Moreover, for those cases where data are
available, i.e. mainly for those that have only
recently dollarised/euroised, exchange rate
developments and the degree of unofficial
dollarisation/euroisation before adopting the
foreign currency are taken into account.
For the European microstates, the available
evidence suggests that inflation rates have been
in line with those observed in their anchor
countries. Moreover, in general, public finances
have been sound. Finally, European microstates
have registered overall balance of payments
46 As the Vatican City has a very small population size and owing to
a lack of data, the remaining part of this section focuses purely on
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino.
47 Almost sixty years later Liechtenstein formally became part of the
Swiss monetary area within the “Currency Agreement” concluded
in 1981. According to this Agreement, all Swiss regulations
concerning monetary policy are automatically applicable in
Liechtenstein.
48 With the exception of the IMF member country San Marino, the
analysis of economic developments in the European microstates is
severely hampered by a lack of reliable data. In many cases the
information provided in the following section is taken from country
websites and the CIA World Factbook. Hence, any conclusions
should be interpreted with care.
49 Some sources even categorise their economic status before World
War II as “impoverished”.21
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surpluses, resulting in a build-up of net foreign
assets.
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– Factor mobility
High growth in the European microstates has
been accompanied by unemployment rates that
have been much lower than in the respective
anchor countries. Thus, the labour market of
several microstates has been characterised by
excess demand and labour migration, with
commuting from the surrounding European
countries forming an important adjustment
mechanism to cope with this excess demand
(Hitzelsberger, Reuter and Steinle 2001).
– Integration via fiscal transfers
The European microstates are independent
countries and have not received any fiscal
transfers from their anchor countries.
Moreover, as public finances have in general
remained sound, there has also been no need for
any fiscal support.
– Real and financial integration
All microstates are highly open economies.
Openness ratios, i.e. the sum of exports and
imports divided by GDP, range from 100% in
Andorra to 400% in San Marino.
Liechtenstein’s exports are in the range of
200% of GDP.  With the exception of
Liechtenstein, where the EU and the US are
major trading partners, trade relations of the
microstates have been dominated by their
respective anchor countries and the EU, with
whom they also form a customs union.
In addition, tourism has been a major source of
integration. Andorra and Monaco are among
the most tourism-intensive economies in
the world, measured by the number of
overnight visitors as a percentage of the total
population (see Chart 3.3). Moreover, most of
the tourists visiting the European microstates
are from neighbouring European countries
(World Tourism Organization 2002).
Banking constitutes the second pillar that the
European microstates have relied on in
developing their economies, benefiting from
regulatory and statutory advantages.50 Thus, the
banking sectors of the European microstates
have become attractive offshore financial
centres (OFC),51 serving a much broader public
than domestic households, enterprises and
institutions. In Monaco, which represents the
most developed financial centre of the four
countries, 90% of banking customers are said to
be non-residents, while non-residents make up
54% of deposits in San Marino (IMF 2001a).
The main activity of the banking system in the
microstates is the reshuffling of funds provided
by non-residents to international capital markets.
Liquid assets by far dominate the balance sheet
of the respective banking sectors. By contrast,
loans to customers only play a negligible role,
with less than 20% of total assets.
4 PANAMA
4.1BASIC FACTS
With a population of 2.9 million, Panama is by
far the largest politically independent country
among the cases of sustained dollarisation. The
introduction of the US dollar as the domestic
currency followed the country’s secession from
Colombia in 1903, which was backed by the
United States. After having gained
independence, the country signed a treaty with
the US allowing for the construction of the
Panama Canal, and establishing the Panama
Canal Zone under US sovereignty. In 1904, the
US dollar became legal tender.52
50 For a detailed account of the advantages for banks and non-
resident investors given by tax privileges in San Marino, see IMF
(1999).
51 Countries are considered to be OFCs if they are classified as
tax havens by the OECD (2000), including the six “advance
commitment jurisdictions” that were not named because they had
publicly committed themselves to eliminating their harmful tax
practices prior to the publication of the report, or were reported as
OFCs by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF 2000).
52 The US dollar is used as a paper currency while the local balboa
exists as coins. Thus, Panama does have a separate currency, but in
practice, most transactions are conducted in US dollars.22
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The Banco Nacional de Panamá (BNP), a state-
owned credit institution created in 1904, acts as
the financial agent for the central government,
is the official clearinghouse for the banking
system, and ensures an adequate supply of US
banknotes to the banking system. Occasionally,
it has also supplied emergency liquidity to
banks. Only recently, in 1998, the
“Superintendencia de Bancos” was created,
marking the start of regulatory and supervisory
reform of the banking system, which had not
been subject to proper public regulation for
decades.
4.2ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE
LONG RUN
Panama’s modern economic development is
intimately linked to the Canal and the financial
sector. In 1925, Panama opened its shipping
registry to international companies, offering an
attractive regulatory and tax system. This
unprecedented act established the system of
“flags of convenience”, making it attractive for
ships from other countries to be registered in
Panama. The Canal is also the basis of the
“Colon Free Zone”, located on its Atlantic side
and established in 1948. It represents the
largest free trading zone in the Western
Hemisphere.
Since the 1970s, the financial sector has
constituted the second pillar on which Panama’s
economic development has been built. The
capital account is entirely open, and banks have
been free to invest excess funds in Panama or
abroad. Until the mid-1980s, gross foreign
assets increased from basically zero to more
than USD 25 billion. Today, the banking sector,
including a well-developed offshore centre,
accounts for approximately 14% of Panama’s
output (IMF 2001c).
The importance of the Canal and banking is also
reflected in the structure of Panama’s economy,
which is overwhelmingly based on the service
sector, accounting for more than 75% of GDP.
Services include commerce, restaurants and
hotels, transport and communications, financial
intermediation, the Colon Free Zone, and the
Panama Canal (IMF 2001c).
Income per capita is about the average of Latin
American and Caribbean countries, and the
country’s growth rate has not been statistically
different from that of non-dollarised countries
(Edwards 2001; Mussa and Loser 1999). The
economy is characterised by the co-existence of
two distinct environments. On the one hand,
there is a relatively affluent, urban, service-
based economy in Panama City, the Canal Zone
and the international banking centre. On the
other hand, the country has a relatively
depressed rural-based economy which, while
representing over half of the population,
accounts for only a small share of GDP (EC
2002).
4.3OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA PROPERTIES
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
Monetary stability in Panama has been
remarkable compared with most other countries
in the region. Indeed, inflation rates have often
been lower than in the United States. Short-term
interest rates have been relatively low as well,
with differentials over the United States limited
to around 100 basis points over Libor rates for
deposits and to 160-200 basis points on
commercial loans.
Fiscal policy, however, has been rather
expansionary for most of the last three decades
(see Table 3.2 and Edwards 2001), largely
financed by extensive foreign borrowing.
Moreover, with the exception of the late 1980s,
when US sanctions hit the economy, Panama
has consistently run current account deficits.
Thus, the external debt/GDP ratio has been
close to 100%.
International long-term bonds are traded with a
risk premium of 400-500 basis points in terms
of bond spreads over US Treasuries. This is
significantly higher than bonds of other
sovereign Latin American borrowers, e.g.
Chile, with similar maturities (Edwards 2001).23
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GDP growth 4.7 0.9 5.1
GDP per capita growth 2.4 -1.0 2.9
Inflation 6.0 3.1 1.1
Government balance (as a % of GDP) -7.3 -5.1 -4.3
Current account balance (as a % of GDP) n.a. -0.11) -3.3
 External debt (as a % of GDP) 57.1 99.7 94.9
Table 3.2 Selected macroeconomic indicators – Panama
Sources: IMF, World Bank, authors’ calculations.
1) 1980-1985: -3.9.
Moreover, spreads over US Treasuries seem to
be largely driven by factors common to
emerging markets (Mussa and Loser 1999;
Goldfajn and Olivares 2000).
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– Factor mobility
In comparison to other Latin American
countries, like El Salvador, Nicaragua or
Ecuador, migration flows from Panama to the
United States have been rather limited.
Estimates put the number of Panamanians living
in the United States between 100,000 and
200,000. Remittances are said to reach between
USD 20 and 170 million (Orozco 2003) and are
not a major source of financing for the
country’s imports.
– Integration via fiscal transfers
There have been no direct fiscal transfers from
the US budget to Panama. However, the
economy has greatly benefited from US
expenditures related to the military presence of
the US. Since the mid-1960s, the country has
continuously relied on substantial support from
the IMF (Edwards 2001; Goldfajn and Olivares
2002). Moreover, Panama went through several
rounds of foreign debt restructuring.
Development aid, provided by the US,
multilateral development banks and other
governments on bilateral terms, has been
comparatively modest (see Table 3.3).
– Real and financial integration
Panama’s openness ratio stands at around 75%.
As per Table 3.3, roughly 35% of trade is with
the anchor country, the United States. Foreign
direct investment, in particular from the US, has
been strong, with the exception of periods when
the Panamanian government took a rather
hostile attitude vis-à-vis the US. The financial
sector is the key sector targeted by foreign
investors. Finance, insurance and real estate
account for more than 95% of all US




Trade (as a % of GDP) n.a. 76.1 75.3
Trade with the US (as a % of total trade) n.a. 38.4 35.7
FDI (as a  % of GDP) 1.3 0.1 5.0
Aid (as a % of GDP) 1.8 1.0 1.0
Table 3.3 Selected indicators of integration – Panama
Sources: IMF, World Bank, authors’ calculations.24
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Panama has achieved a high degree of financial
integration by attracting non-residents through
favourable secrecy and control regulations.53
More than a third of the roughly 80 banks
operating in the country are offshore institutions,
more than half of the liabilities of the banking
system are foreign liabilities, and a large part of
banking activity consists of re-channelling
foreign funds to onshore financial markets.54
Loans to the domestic economy, on the other
hand, account for only 50% of total loans. Even
this is a rather new phenomenon, reflecting the
credit boom Panama has experienced over the last
decade, during which time business, housing and
consumer loans to the domestic economy have
almost tripled, growing much faster than GDP.
To substitute for the missing local lender of last
resort, domestic banks have established lines of
credit with foreign banks with branches in
Panama, and have usually been able to draw on
them during liquidity crunches (Mussa and Loser
1999).55
5 REMAINING CASES OF SUSTAINED
DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION
5.1BASIC FACTS
The majority of the remaining 45 cases of
sustained dollarisation/euroisation are small,
dependent territories. French, US and Danish
dependencies have always used the French
franc (now the euro), the US dollar and the
Danish krone respectively, whereas Bermuda,
the British Virgin Islands, and the Turks and
Caicos Islands followed other Caribbean
countries in the early 1970s and switched from
the British pound to the US dollar (Box 3).56
Turning to independent countries, the British
pound played a significant role in the monetary
history of several countries in the Caribbean
that are currently using the US dollar (see
Box 3.1), and countries in southern Africa
that are now part of the Rand zone. The US-
administered UN trusteeships in the Pacific57
continue to use the US dollar as their domestic
currency even though they gained independence
in the mid-1980s/1990s.
5.2ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE
LONG RUN
Dollarised/euroised countries have on average a
higher per capita income than countries with
their own currencies (see Table 3.4). Twelve of
them, namely Bermuda, the European
microstates, Jersey, Guam, Guernsey, the
Faeroes, Greenland, the Isle of Man and
Gibraltar, belong to the 40 richest countries
worldwide, expressed by per capita income
levels according to purchasing power parity.
Only five dollarised/euroised countries –
Bhutan, Tuvalu, Tokelau, Kiribati and Mayotte
– have a per capita income per annum of less
than 1,500 USD. The difference in per capita
income levels between dollarised/euroised
countries and countries with their own
currencies is even more striking when
comparing the median of the respective country
groupings.
53 Hausmann and Eichengreen (1999) note that “the financial depth
and stability of the Panamanian financial system is not associated
with the transparency and good practices that dollarization is
supposed to bring, but precisely with the country’s lack of
transparency.” Only in the 1990s, when the international campaign
against money laundering activities intensified, did the authorities
tighten regulations and strengthen the role of the Banking
Supervisory Authority (IMF 2001c).
54 The analysis of the Panamanian banking sector mainly relies on
information provided in IMF (2001c).
55 Of the 54 banks with a general license, 26 are banks with
headquarters in Panama, accounting for 55% of the banking
sector’s assets. 18 are branches of foreign banks, and 10 operate as
(separately capitalised) subsidiaries of foreign banks. European
and North American banks hold around 30% of total banking sector
assets.
56 The Pitcairn islands use the New Zealand dollar. Former UK
dependencies that became dependencies of Australia and New
Zealand implicitly experienced a change in the currency regime as
well, since they now use the Australian/New Zealand dollar rather
than the British pound.
57 The Federal States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau.25
ECB







FROM STERLING TO US DOLLAR – A SHORT REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENCY
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN1
Up to the end of the 1950s/early 1960s English-speaking countries in the Caribbean operated
sterling-based currency boards as a legacy of their colonial past. Trade and financial links were
already stronger with the US than with the UK, but under the Bretton Woods system of fixed
parities, this mismatch of monetary and real/financial links was not perceived as an economic
challenge.
This changed after the 1967 devaluation of sterling against the US dollar, causing an
inflationary shock in the region. Thus, when the Bretton Woods regime collapsed, most
countries in the region switched to a US dollar peg, including the Bahamas, Barbados and
Belize.2 Since then they have managed their currencies in a quasi-currency board manner,
maintaining levels of foreign reserves so that they were always able to intervene successfully in
support of the peg. Only Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago abandoned the quasi-
currency board strategy in the 1970s and 1980s.
1 This box relies on information provided by Worrell (2003) and Beek et al. (2000).
2 The member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, namely Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat,
St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, decided to establish a common currency, the East Caribbean dollar, based on a currency board
arrangement with a US dollar peg.
Restricting the comparison to the sample of
non-industrialised countries reveals that, both
on average and in median terms, dollarised/
euroised countries are significantly richer than
developing countries and emerging market
economies with their own currencies.
Moreover, politically-dependent dollarised/
euroised jurisdictions have on average reached
higher income levels than independent
dollarised/euroised economies (see Table
3.4).58
As in the European microstates, the high level
of income of several dollarised/euroised
countries is a post-World War II phenomenon,
in particular in the Caribbean. Again, tourism
and banking constitute core sectors contributing
to the rapid development of the respective
economies.
5.3OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA PROPERTIES
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
Available evidence suggests that, in general, the
inflation rates of dollarised/euroised countries
have generally moved in line with those of the
respective anchor countries. In particular,
inflation rates in the Bahamas and Barbados are
highly and positively correlated with the
inflation rate in the United States. In Belize,
correlation with US inflation increased
substantially after switching to the US dollar in
1981.
Somewhat lower are the correlation coefficients
between the inflation rates of the three countries
in the Rand zone and the South African inflation
rate. Finally, the example of Kiribati relative to
Australia suggests that inflation rate
movements of the dollarised country do not
58 Among the dependent dollarised/euroised jurisdictions only
Reunion, Saint Helena, Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau and Mayotte
have a per capita income of less than USD 5,000 (in PPP terms).26
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 11
February 2004
Groups (political status, sample size) Average Median
World (all countries and jurisdictions, 228) 8,800 4,780
Countries with their own currencies (all countries and jurisdictions, 182) 8,200 4,200
Dollarised/euroised countries (all countries and jurisdictions, 46) 2) 11,120 8,850
Dollarised/euroised countries (independent countries, 19) 9,400 4,500
Dollarised/euroised countries (dependencies, 27) 12,340 11,150
Non-industrialised countries (205) 6,840 4,090
Table 3.4 Per capita income in selected country groups1)
(in USD, in PPP terms)
Sources: CIA World Factbook, authors’ calculations.
1) Most recent data available.
2) Excluding Pitcairn, the Cocos, Christmas and Norfolk Islands, the Vatican City.
have to be closely aligned with those in the
anchor country. Kiribati has a narrow-based
economy, with 80% of Kiribati households
making a living by fishing. Hence, the economy
is highly vulnerable to external, asymmetric
shocks that affect price developments.59 Thus,
inflation developments in Kiribati are only
mildly correlated with those in Australia.
As has already been mentioned, fiscal policies
in dollarised/euroised countries seem to show
similar results as those of countries with their
own currencies (Edwards and Magendzo 2001).
However, as will be shown below in more
detail, many dollarised/euroised countries and
jurisdictions have received substantial fiscal
transfers from their respective anchor
countries.
Many countries with a long history of
dollarisation/euroisation can be characterised as
countries with large trade deficits.60 Since
neither GDP nor current account data are
available for many cases of dollarisation/
euroisation, the trade balance/total exports ratio
is used as an indicator for the purpose of cross-
country comparison. Using this indicator,
available evidence suggests that 25 of the 50
countries with the highest trade deficit are
dollarised/euroised countries (see Chart 3.1).61
12 cases of dollarisation/euroisation can be
found among the other 100 countries and
territories that also have trade deficits. Only
three (Liechtenstein, Nauru and the Faeroes) of
the 40 cases of dollarisation/euroisation where
data are available show higher exports than
imports.
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– Factor mobility
Available evidence indicates that labour has
largely moved from euroised/dollarised
countries to the respective anchor countries.
For example, the Caribbean island states have
experienced a flow of labour from the islands to
North America and the UK (Lester 2002).62 In
the Pacific, Niue is an example of sizeable
labour flows to the anchor country, New
Zealand. The economies of Kiribati, the Cook
Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu benefit from
substantial remittances, indicating that labour
has been mobile in the past. In the Rand Zone,
Lesotho and Swaziland are recipients of
sizeable remittances from miners employed in
South Africa.
– Diversity of products
Several dollarised/euroised countries have
economies based on a few products.63 Bhutan,
the Federated States of Micronesia and Wallis
and Futuna largely depend on agriculture,
59 Similar evidence can be found for the Marshall Islands (IMF 1998).
60 See also the evidence provided by Rose and Engel (2000).
61 The CIA World Factbook does not provide data for Christmas
Island, the Cocos Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man,
Monaco, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Pitcairn Islands, San
Marino and the Virgin Islands.
62 Labour mobility within the islands seems to be rather low.
63 See also the evidence provided by Rose and Engel (2000).27
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forestry and fishing, which account for up to
90% of the labour force. The economies of the
Faeroes, Greenland and St. Pierre and Miquelon
critically depend on fishing. Some dollarised/
euroised economies depend almost exclusively
on the production of a few natural resources,
such as Christmas Island and Nauru (phosphate
mining), Namibia (extraction and processing of
minerals) and New Caledonia (nickel).
– Integration via fiscal transfers
A striking feature of many dollarised/euroised
countries and jurisdictions is that they have
received substantial financial transfers from their
respective anchor countries (see Table 3.5).64 The
degree of dependency has been extraordinary.
The islands in the North Pacific and the Danish
and French dependencies have received subsidies
from their respective anchor countries to such an
extent that their relatively high per capita GDP
largely depends on this support.
Chart 3.1 High merchandise trade deficit countries1)
Sources: CIA factbook; authors’ calculations.
Note: Dark blue bars mark dollarised/euroised countries.
1) In percent of the respective country’s exports; latest available f.o.b. or c.i.f. data. For the following countries listed in Table 3.1 there were
no data available: Christmas Is., Cook Is., Virgin Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Monaco, San Marino, Northern Mariana Is., Pitcairns
Is., Vatican City.
2) Cayman Islands: - 38016.7%.
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Financial dependence is most pronounced for
dependencies, as 17 out of 31 jurisdictions
share this characteristic. Moreover, one-third of
the independent dollarised/euroised countries
rely to a large extent on transfers from their
anchor countries. Thus, financial dependence is
a key feature of sustained cases of dollarisation/
euroisation (see Box 4).
64 A country is defined as financially dependent when it either
receives ODA flows of more than 5% of GNI, of which at least 20%
originates from one donor country. Data are taken from the OECD
(2002) database. A country is also defined as financially dependent
when it is referred to in the CIA World Factbook as receiving
“substantial transfers” or being “highly dependent on subsidies”.
This cross-referencing is necessary because the OECD coverage
is limited, as well as to capture more subtle cases through which
countries may receive official transfers.28
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Political ODA as % Largest Anchor
Country status Qualitative evidence 1) of GDP 2) donor country
American Samoa dependent ”[I]mportant financial support from the US [...] Transfers from n/a US US
the US Government add substantially to American Samoa’s
economic well-being.”
Cook Islands dependent ”$13.1 million (1995); New Zealand continues to furnish the n/a New New
greater part” Zealand Zealand
Faeroe Islands dependent ”$135 million annual subsidy from Denmark (1999)” n/a Denmark Denmark
French Guiana dependent ”The economy is tied closely to that of France through n/a France France
 subsidies and imports.”
French Polynesia dependent ”The territory substantially benefits from development 9% France France
agreements with France aimed principally at creating new
businesses and strengthening social services.”
Greenland dependent The economy remains critically dependent on exports of fish n/a Denmark Denmark
and substantial support from the Danish Government, which
 supplies about half of government  revenues [...] $380 million
subsidy from Denmark (1999)
Guadeloupe dependent ”[The economy] depends on France for large subsidies and n/a France France
 imports”
Guam dependent  ”Guam receives large transfer payments from the US Federal n/a US US
Treasury ($143 million in 1997)”
Martinique dependent ”[S]ubstantial annual aid from France n/a France France
Mayotte dependent ”$107.7 million (1995); note - extensive French financial n/a France France
assistance”
New Caledonia dependent ”In addition to nickel, the substantial financial support from 10% France France
France and tourism are keys to the health of the economy.”
N. Mariana Islands dependent ”The economy benefits substantially from financial assistance n/a US US
from the US.”
Reunion dependent ”The economic well-being of Reunion depends heavily on n/a France France
continued financial assistance from France.”
Saint Helena dependent ”The economy depends largely on financial assistance from the n/a UK UK
UK, which amounted to about $5 million in 1997 or almost
one-half of annual budgetary revenues.”
Saint Pierre & dependent ”The islands are heavily subsidized by France to the great n/a France France
Miquelon betterment of living standards [...] [A]pproximately $65 million
in annual grants from France.”
Tokelau dependent ”The people must rely on aid from New Zealand to maintain n/a New New
public services, annual aid being substantially greater than GDP.” Zealand Zealand
Wallis and Futuna dependent ”Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing n/a France France
of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and
 remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia.”
Bhutan independent ”The government of India finances nearly three-fifths of Bhutan’s 12% India India
budget expenditures.”
Kiribati independent ”Foreign financial aid, from UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 22% Australia Australia
and China, is a critical supplement to GDP, equal to 25%-50%
of GDP in recent years.”
Marshall Islands independent ”US Government assistance is the mainstay of this tiny island 57% US US
economy ... Under the terms of the Compact of Free Association,
 the US provides roughly $39 million in annual aid.”
Micronesia, Fed. St independent ”[U]nder terms of the Compact of Free Association, the US will 40% US US
provide $1.3 billion in grant aid during the period 1986-2001
Niue independent ”Government expenditures regularly exceed revenues, and the n/a New New
shortfall is made up by critically needed grants from New Zealand Zealand Zealand
Palau independent ”The government is the major employer of the work force, relying 21% US US
heavily on financial assistance from the US.”
Tuvalu independent ”Substantial income is received annually from an international n/a n/a Australia
 trust fund established in 1987 by Australia, NZ, and the UK and
supported also by Japan and South Korea.”
Table 3.5 Official development assistance/subsidies and sustained cases of dollarisation/
euroisation
1) CIA World Factbook.
2) OECD (2000 or latest available data).29
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– Real and financial integration
Anchor countries are the major trading partners
of dollarised/euroised countries (see Chart 3.2).
This is in line with empirical evidence provided
by Rose (2000), suggesting that dollarised/
euroised countries trade more with their
respective anchor countries than a standard
gravity model of trade would predict (see
Section 3.2).
However, there is also evidence indicating that
the degree of openness and trade integration
with the respective anchor country is rather
similar to that of other countries in the
geographical vicinity. For example, comparing
the share of trade with the US in total trade for
the three dollarised independent countries in the
Caribbean and Panama with other countries in
the Western Hemisphere suggests that the level
of trade integration with the US is not
exceptionally high in the case of the dollarised
countries.
Some dollarised countries in the Caribbean have
been extremely successful in attracting foreign
investment. Again, however, similar levels of
integration can be found for other countries in
the region. For example, expressed as a ratio of
GDP, Bermuda has one of the highest FDI
inward stock worldwide, but this is about the
same as in the neighbouring Cayman Islands.
This is because investment in the financial
sector dominates, suggesting that FDI in these
countries is mainly driven by their common
status as OFCs. In contrast, dollarised/euroised
countries in the Pacific, i.e. Kiribati, Tuvalu and
New Caledonia, have been less able than other
Pacific islands, e.g. Fiji, to attract foreign direct
investment.
Finally, tourism is an important real integration
factor between dollarised/euroised countries
and their respective anchor countries. This
tendency is most pronounced for cases located
in the close geographical proximity of the
respective anchor countries, e.g. the Caribbean
islands and the European microstates. Available
data suggest that a greater proportion of tourists
to dollarised/euroised countries come from the
Chart 3.2 Trade of selected cases of
dollarisation/euroisation with their
respective anchor countries
(as a percentage of total trade, average 1980-1996)
Sources: IMF, authors’ calculations.
Note: The anchor countries are France (Reunion, Guadeloupe,
Martinique, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, French Guiana, St.
Pierre and Miquelon), Denmark (Greenland, Faeroe Islands),
United Kingdom (St. Helena, Falkland Islands), US (Bermuda,
Panama, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize), Australia (Kiribati, Nauru,
Tuvalu). Moreover, the share of the EU has been added for all
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Chart 3.3 Tourist-oriented countries:
number of overnight visitors per year
(as % of total population)
Note: Dark blue bars mark dollarised/euroised countries.
Sources: World Tourism Organization, authors’ calculations.
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anchor country (World Tourism Organization
2002).
Moreover, as in the case of fiscal transfers, the
exposure to tourism seems to be exceptionally
high in comparison with other countries. Of the
top 15 countries in terms of tourism activity, 10
are dollarised/euroised (see Chart 3.3). About
one-third of the 42 “highly tourist-oriented” 65
countries are dollarised/euroised, whereas only
five of the 82 countries with a tourism inflow of
less than 10% of the domestic population
represent cases of dollarisation/euroisation
(Bhutan, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands,
Lesotho and Tuvalu).66 Thus, real integration
via tourism seems to be a second characteristic
distinguishing dollarised/euroised countries
and jurisdictions from other countries (see Box
4).
Offshore finance plays an important role in
many cases of sustained dollarisation/
euroisation. Indeed, 20 out of 51 dollarised/
euroised countries have established OFCs.
Given the small size of most of the countries
under review and the substantial flows to
offshore centres,67 it can be assumed that in
terms of GDP or expressed in per capita
figures, financial integration between these
countries and jurisdictions and their respective
anchor countries is unusually large. Indeed, the
limited amount of information available
suggests that funds from residents of the
respective anchor countries account for a
substantial share of assets managed in
dollarised/euroised OFCs (see for example UK
Home Office 1998). Hence, financial
integration via the establishment of offshore
financial centres seems to be a third
characteristic that distinguishes dollarised/
euroised countries and jurisdictions from other
countries (see Box 4).
65 We define countries as “highly tourist-oriented” if the number of
annual overnight visitors exceeds the population.
66 There are no data available for 20 cases of dollarisation/
euroisation, namely American Samoa, Christmas Island, the Cocos
Islands, Nauru, Norfolk Island, the Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau, the
Faeroes, Greenland, the Falkland Islands, Guernsey, Gibraltar,
Jersey, the Isle of Man, Saint Helena, the Vatican City, San Marino,
Mayotte, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna.
67 For example, offshore centres account for roughly 8% of total
foreign claims by BIS reporting banks and for about 42% of total
foreign claims by BIS reporting banks that are held against non-
developed countries.
Box 4
SUSTAINED CASES OF DOLLARISATION/EUROISATION – EVIDENCE FROM A LOGIT MODEL ON THE
ROLE OF FINANCIAL TRANSFERS, TOURISM DEPENDENCE AND OFFSHORE FINANCE1
The analysis of sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation highlights financial dependence,
tourism and offshore finance as being special features of these countries. Using the dataset
provided by Frankel and Rose (2002),2 it can be shown that these characteristics have a
statistically significant influence on the probability of two countries sharing a common
currency, controlling for the influence of other variables.
To model financial dependence, tourism and offshore finance as explanatory variables, the
following data series were created:
1 The box is based on Mehl and Winkler (2003).
2 In total, the data set contains 41,678 country pairs of observations spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and
1995) and includes the CFA franc zone and ECCA countries as countries sharing a common currency. Hence, the definition of a
currency union is wider than that of dollarisation/euroisation used in the main text. Controlling variables are bilateral trade, joint
economic “mass”, institutional dependence, as well as common language, borders and membership in a regional trade agreement.31
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial dependence 3.28 3.63 4.39 3.08
dummy (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(50% threshold)
Financial dependence 3.03 2.44
dummy (0.01) (0.03)
(20% threshold)
Offshore centre 1.75 2.19 1.83 2.07 2.75 2.55
dummy (0.08) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tourism dependence 1.91 2.19 2.81 2.21 1.51 1.37
dummy (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) (0.14) (0.10) (0.16)
Log (product GDPs) -0.79 -0.40 -0.20 -0.42 -0.45 -0.46
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (bilateral trade) 0.81 0.58 0.61 0.66 0.69
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Common regional trade 2.26 2.57
agreement dummy (0.12) (0.04)
Institutional 2.62 3.03
dependence dummy (0.00) (0.00)
Common borders 4.16 3.29
dummy (0.00) (0.05)




Table 3.A Logit estimates
(dependent variable: currency union)
– Financial dependence. A financial dependence dummy is set equal to 1 when a country
receives more than 20% or 50% of net ODA flows from one donor country, as reported in
OECD (2002), and 0 otherwise. When OECD data are unavailable, a country is considered
financially dependent if it is characterised by the CIA World Factbook as receiving
“substantial transfers” or being “highly dependent on subsidies”.
– Tourism. A country is considered to be highly dependent on tourism flows from another
country when (i) annual overnight visitors in 2000 (or the latest period available) exceeded its
own population, and (ii) arrivals from the anchor country accounted for the highest share of
tourists, as reported in World Tourism Organization (2002).
– Offshore finance. Countries are considered as an offshore centre if they are reported as such
by the Financial Stability Forum (2000) or classified as a tax haven by the OECD (2000).
Adding these variables to the Frankel and Rose data set reduces the number of country pairs to
5245.3 Among them, 27 are currency unions, which implies that the sample unconditional
3 Since data on financial dependence by definition are only available for country pairs including one OECD country, the size of the
bilateral panel data set is around 12% that of Frankel and Rose (2002). Owing to data unavailability, both the tourism dependence and
offshore centre dummies are time-invariant, while all other variables are time-variant.32
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probability (frequency) of observing a currency union is 0.5%.4   Using logit estimates the
following results can be obtained (Table 3.A), where standard errors are robust to clustered
heterogeneity with p-values in parentheses.
– Financial dependence, offshore finance and tourism dependence all positively and
significantly influence the probability of two countries sharing a common currency (see Table
3.A, regressions (1) and (2)).
– The effect of financial dependence and offshore finance is robust to changes in specification.
Lowering the threshold used to define financial dependence from 50% to 20% of net ODA
flows, or including in the regressions dummies to control for a common language, borders
and membership in a regional trade agreement as well as institutional independence, leaves
results broadly unchanged (see Table 3.A, regressions (4), (5) and (6)). Conversely, the
effect of tourism dependence proves less robust, suggesting that tourism dependence is less
important than financial dependence or the existence of offshore activities in explaining the
probability of a country choosing to forego its own currency.
– Finally, in line with traditional OCA theory, higher (bilateral) trade integration influences
positively the probability that a country pair forms a currency union. Conversely, the
probability of a currency union is negatively affected by the economic “mass” of a country
pair, possibly indicating that, for a given anchor country’s economic size, the smaller the
other country is, the more likely it is to forego its own currency. Two countries that are
institutionally dependent, share borders, but not a language, and that are part of the same
regional trade agreement, are also intuitively found to have a higher probability of sharing a
common currency.
Using the logit results to estimate conditional probabilities – regression (2) is taken as a
baseline model, evaluated at the sample averages of the 27 currency unions’ bilateral trade and
joint economic mass5 – leads to the following results:
– For a given country pair, the conditional probability of a currency union if one of the countries
is financially dependent, tourism-dependent and an offshore centre is estimated at 85.3%.
– If none of the two countries is financially dependent, tourism-dependent or an offshore
centre, the conditional probability of a currency union is then only 0.2%.
This suggests how massive the effect of financial and tourism dependence as well as offshore
finance is on a country’s likelihood of sharing the currency of another country. By the same
token, the probability of observing a currency union if one of the countries is financially
dependent  is 6.7%, while it is 1.7% if one of the countries is either tourism-dependent or an
offshore centre. This indicates that financial dependence is ceteris paribus relatively more
important in a country’s decision to forego its own currency.
4 The currency union observations in the sample are Australia and Kiribati (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990), Denmark and Greenland
(1990), France and French Guiana (1990), France and Guadeloupe (1985 and 1990), France and New Caledonia (1985 and 1990),
France and Reunion (1980, 1985 and 1990), India and Bhutan (1985), New Zealand and the Cook Islands (1980), the US and Liberia
(1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985) and the US and Panama (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995).
5 Choosing another specification from Table 2 or changing the values plugged in for the bilateral trade and economic variables may
obviously impact the magnitude of the estimated probabilities. Thus, only the overall conclusions should be taken literally.33
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6 COMMON ELEMENTS AND MAIN LESSONS FROM
SUSTAINED CASES
The review of cases of sustained dollarisation/
euroisation was motivated by recent empirical
research on the trade effects of a common
currency, as it has strong implications for the
dollarisation/euroisation debate. This is
because results suggested that countries
considering dollarisation/euroisation have
reason to be confident that immediate gains in
terms of stability will be followed by closer
integration with the respective anchor country.
As integration is seen as a key mechanism for
supporting the long-run sustainability of the
exchange rate arrangement, this evidence could
be seen as supporting the view that optimum
currency areas develop endogenously.
Keeping data limitations in mind, the
comprehensive analysis of sustained cases,
considering a wide range of factors to assess
the costs and benefits of establishing a common
currency area by means of official unilateral
dollarisation/euroisation, qualifies this result,
as the analysis suggests that sustained cases of
dollarisation/euroisation have taken recourse to
three integration mechanisms that are rather
exogenous to the exchange rate regime: fiscal
transfers from the anchor country, tourism and
offshore finance.
In terms of the criteria stressed by the new and
old OCA theory, the results of the analysis can
be summarised as follows:
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– There is strong support for the view that
dollarisation/euroisation is associated with
considerable monetary stability. Countries
with a long history of dollarisation/
euroisation seem to have similar inflation
patterns as their respective anchor countries.
Exceptions can be found in those island
economies whose production structure is
narrowly based on one or two key products.
Here nominal convergence with the anchor
countries has been more limited.
– Political considerations played a key role in
the countries’ “choice” to adopt a foreign
currency, as most cases are politically-
dependent jurisdictions or have had this
status for a very long time. Only in the few
Caribbean cases where there has been a
change in the anchor currency from the
British pound to the US dollar, might it be
argued that the quest for monetary stability
motivated the anchor currency switch.
– Dollarised/euroised countries have a
significantly higher per capita income than
countries with their own currencies.
However, this is mainly owing to the
performance of dependencies in the sample
of countries. Independent dollarised/
euroised countries have about the same
average per capita income as countries with
their own currencies.
– Earlier research has shown that the fiscal
performance of dollarised/euroised countries
has been similar to that of countries with
their own currencies. The analysis conducted
above reveals that many dollarised/euroised
countries depend to a large extent on fiscal
transfers from their respective anchor
countries.
– Dollarised/euroised countries, in general,
run large trade deficits, as their volume of
imports is often a multiple of their volume of
exports.
– For Panama, the only dollarised country that
has issued international bonds, there is little
evidence that dollarisation has allowed a
decoupling from global emerging market
trends. Rather, spreads over US Treasuries
seem to be driven to a significant extent by
factors common to emerging markets.
Against the background of the cost-benefit
criteria discussed in Section 2, the experience
of sustained cases suggests that monetary
stability is a key feature in dollarisation/
euroisation. However, credibility issues did not
play a role when countries opted for this34
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monetary regime, as none of them had
conducted an independent domestic monetary
policy prior to dollarisation/euroisation. There
is also little evidence that dollarisation/
euroisation has contributed to fiscal discipline
in the respective countries. On the contrary,
they have run substantial fiscal deficits that
have been largely financed by transfers from the
anchor countries. Financial sector development
has advanced in many dollarised/euroised
countries, but mainly in terms of offshore
banking rather than in providing services to
residents. Finally, fiscal transfers and revenues
from offshore activities and tourism have
allowed many countries to run large trade
deficits as their import volume is a multiple of
their volume of exports.
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– There is evidence that factor mobility and the
associated flow of remittances are important
characteristics of some dollarised/euroised
countries.
– Some countries, particularly remote island
states, show a high degree of product
concentration.
– As suggested by recent research on the trade
effects of a common currency, countries with
a long history of dollarisation/euroisation
show a high degree of trade integration with
their respective anchor country. Moreover,
in the few cases where there has been a
change in the anchor currency, e.g. from the
British pound to the US dollar, this switch
was in line with changing patterns of trade
integration.
– In addition to strong trade linkages,
dollarised/euroised countries are highly
integrated with their respective anchor
countries in political terms. Many of them
are dependencies of their anchor countries.
These strong political links are evidenced by
large fiscal transfers from the latter.
– Offshore finance is another highly
developed aspect of integration between
anchor countries and the dollarised/euroised
economies.
– Many dollarised/euroised countries are
tourism-dependent. Even though tourism
flows to these countries do not only originate
from the respective anchor countries, it is
fair to characterise tourism as a key aspect of
integration in dollarised/euroised countries.
Summing up, the analysis of sustained cases of
dollarisation/euroisation suggests that close
integration with the anchor country is a feature
covering many areas. In addition to
international trade, integration via fiscal
transfers, offshore finance and tourism have
also played a crucial role.
In stating this, it is not intended to assert that
the mechanisms that have been employed to
ensure this high level of integration aimed at
making the exchange rate regime sustainable.
For example, there is little evidence that the
patterns of financial aid or financial flows are
strongly linked to exogenous, asymmetric
shocks or have shock-smoothing characteristics
(Kose and Prasad 2002). There is also little
evidence that the development of tourism
facilities or the establishment of offshore
centres were primarily motivated by such
considerations.68 However, irrespective of the
motives those policies were based on, sustained
cases of dollarisation/euroisation represent
examples of the integration view of
dollarisation/euroisation.
When conducting these policies, special,
exogenous characteristics of the sustained
cases, such as size, political status and location,
seem to have been instrumental in achieving
such a high degree of integration.
– Small size. Their small size allows fiscal
transfers from donor countries to have
68 Rather, they were part of the general development strategy of the
respective countries, as policies fostering real integration via
tourism and financial integration have been also pursued by a
number of other countries with similar characteristics that are not
dollarised/euroised.35
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comparatively large effects on income levels
in the recipient countries. This might explain
why, irrespective of exchange rate regimes,
the degree of aid dependency, measured by
the ratio of foreign aid to GDP, is
particularly high in small states (Kose and
Prasad 2002). In addition, only very small
countries may benefit from taking a “free-
rider” position by offering non-residents a
lenient fiscal and regulatory framework
(Padoa-Schioppa 2001; IMF 2000).
– Political status. The fact that they are
dependencies or have very close political
relations with the anchor countries has a
positive effect on all three integration
mechanisms identified above. The
willingness of countries to grant fiscal
transfers is certainly influenced by political
considerations and affiliations. Offshore
centres can only attract sizeable capital flows
if investors feel that political stability is
guaranteed. Thus, being a dependency of a
politically stable country with a strong and
trusted legal environment may be as
important as tax and regulatory privileges.
The same can be said with regard to tourism.
Even the most beautiful landscape is of
limited value for the development of tourism
if countries lack the political stability that is
needed to attract tourists and investment into
tourism infrastructure.
– Location. Although there are exceptions, the
potential for offshore finance and tourism
seems to rely to a significant extent on the
location of the country, i.e. its being in the
geographical vicinity of the anchor country.
For tourism, of course, natural beauty and
cultural heritage are additional factors
determining whether countries can use this
integration mechanism.
Thus, there are doubts whether integration
between dollarised/euroised and anchor
countries has evolved endogenously through
the sharing of a common currency. Moreover, if
exogenous characteristics have been crucial in
achieving the high level of integration,
questions remain whether countries that do not
share these characteristics would be able to
draw on the same mechanisms of integration.
These considerations are important as, for most
other countries, criteria focusing on
‘traditional’ integration instruments, such as
trade, foreign direct investment and other cross-
border flows, seem to indicate that
dollarisation/euroisation is most likely not
advisable (see Section 2).36
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Dollarisation/euroisation is often seen as
irreversible (Mussa and Loser 1999). Indeed,
cases of abandoning dollarisation/euroisation
are rare, and mostly related to the gaining of
independence by the respective countries. An
exception is Liberia, where political turmoil and
civil war ended more than one hundred years of
dollarisation. However, Liberia’s failure to
sustain dollarisation may also be explained by
economic factors mentioned in the old OCA
literature.
1 COLONIAL REGIMES
The adoption of another country’s currency was
one of the most widely-used monetary regimes
in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century.
At that time, colonial regimes prevailed, and
economic theory was still based on the
assumption that national economic policies and
hence national monies are neither necessary nor
powerful.
The institutional features of colonial monetary
regimes differed from case to case, but had
in common the fact that colonies did not
enjoy monetary sovereignty. While several
colonial regimes resembled or were based on
currency boards69, some of them were actually
similar to “unilateral” dollarisation/euroisation.
Interestingly, the main economic justification
for introducing the colonisers’ money in the
respective colonies was to facilitate trade and
integration between the colonial powers and
their dependent territories (Ghosh, Gulde and
Wolf 2000).
With the decolonisation process, new
independent governments wanted to take
control of domestic liquidity conditions. They
therefore created central banks and introduced
new national monies.70 The same happened in
the early 1990s, when many new states were
created owing to the break-up of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. All of
these started issuing national currencies
without seriously considering the adoption of
the currency of another country.




Liberia is a small West African country but,
with a population of about 3.0 million, is much
larger than most countries with a long history of
dollarisation. Founded in 1821 as a haven for
freed American slaves, it became independent in
1847. From the very beginning, however,
tensions were high between freed American
slaves and the local population (World Bank
1997). The indigenous population, which was
in favour of severing links with the US,
increasingly prevailed in domestic policies in
the 1980s and 1990s.
US coins and banknotes had been circulating in
Liberia since the 1800s and were declared legal
tender in 1944. In 1974 a central bank was
established. Fifteen years later, the Liberian
dollar was introduced as a fully-fledged
currency, pegged to the US dollar at a 1:1
parity. Finally, in 1998 the official parity of the
Liberian dollar with the US dollar was formally
abandoned.
2.2ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD
WAR II71
Until the end of the 1970s, Liberia’s post-
World War II economic development was based
on mining, forestry and rubber concessions
69 Currency boards were mainly used in the British Dominions
(Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2000). In general, colonial powers wanted
to create and preserve close monetary links with the colonies.
However, at the same time, they wanted to reduce the need to
transport money – in particular gold and silver coins – for cost and
security reasons. Finally, they had to cope with a growing demand
for money from colonies, owing to an increase in trade, as
additionally had to face the risk that money circulating in the
colonies could be repatriated. This is why colonial powers often
centralised monetary powers but created local monetary
administrations. In addition, they introduced special series of
banknotes and coins for circulation only, but treated them as legally
equal to their domestic currencies or established legal instruments
to preserve a 1:1 parity.
70 An overview of the historical evolution of monetary regimes in
Africa is provided by Honohan and O’Connell (1997).
71 If not otherwise noted, information on macroeconomic and trade
developments are based on data provided by the IMF (International
Financial Statistics, Direction of Trade Statistics) and the World
Bank (Bruno and Easterly (1993) dataset and the Global
Development Network Growth database).37
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dominated by multinational companies,
accounting for more than 40% of GDP
(Maynard 1970; World Bank 2001a). In the
1960s and early 1970s, the country saw a
continued increase in living standards, with
GDP growth rates averaging 6% and 4%
respectively. At that time, GDP per capita
reached about 85% of the level prevailing in
Egypt.72 However, the income distribution
remained highly skewed owing to the existence
of a huge subsistence agricultural sector,
accounting for most of the employment (80% of
the workforce). Estimates put average per capita
GDP in this traditional sector of the economy at
about one-tenth of income levels reached in the
modern sector of the economy.
The oil price increase in the early 1970s
confronted the county with a substantial terms-
of-trade shock. Moreover, the subsequent
recession in industrial countries led to a
reduction in demand for Liberian exports.
Growth rates declined, reaching on average
only 1% per annum in the period 1974 to 1979,
which was not enough to stabilise per capita
income levels. In 1979, government plans to
increase the price of rice led to riots and
widespread violence. A year later a coup placed
the country under military rule and a decade of
economic decline began. In 1989, civil war
broke out and economic activity came to a
virtual standstill, with GDP per capita falling to
about 10% of its pre-war level.
2.3OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA PROPERTIES73
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
Available evidence for Liberia supports the
proposition that dollarisation favours a low-
inflation environment. From 1966–1989, the
period for which data are available, Liberian
inflation remained subdued and followed
similar patterns as in the United States (see
Chart 4.1). The stability record is particularly
noticeable after the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system. Whereas Liberia managed to
keep inflation low, neighbouring Sierra Leone
and Ghana experienced periods with inflation
reaching more than 100% per year. However,
the example of two neighbouring CFA franc
zone countries suggests that the inflation record
was fairly similar under more traditional
exchange rate peg conditions.
Turning to fiscal developments, the post-1974
period was characterised by rising budget
deficits as the government tried to stimulate the
economy by launching large public investment
programmes. Moreover, the newly created
National Bank of Liberia was heavily involved
in financing government expenditures. In 1979,
about 95% of its total assets consisted of claims
on the central government. The balance of the
consolidated central government budget turned
from a surplus of USD 6.8 million in 1974 to a
deficit of about USD 140 million in 1979,
approximately 13% of GDP. Fiscal discipline
eroded before dollarisation finally came to an
end.
In 1988 Liberia’s fiscal deficit had increased to
almost 19% of GDP. The balance of payments
had worsened as well, while the level of
outstanding debt had reached 170% of GDP.
Local and foreign depositors transferred
convertible deposits abroad, contributing to a
dramatic fall in US dollar liquidity. The
authorities responded by starting to manipulate
the currency regime, attributing money-issuing
competencies to the National Bank of Liberia.
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
In the 1960s and early 1970s, in stark contrast
to policies in most other African countries,
which were following developing strategies
based on import substitution, Liberia aimed at
real and financial integration with the anchor
country and the world economy. For example,
in the 1960s Liberia’s trade-to-GDP ratio rose
from about 70% to more than 100%, making
Liberia one of the most open economies of the
world. At that time, the US was Liberia’s major
trade partner, accounting for more than one-
third of Liberian exports and about 40% of
72 The figure is based on the Penn World Tables compiled by Heston
and Summers.
73 The following analysis does not include the period after the
outbreak of civil war in 1989.38
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imports.74 The raw material sector attracted
substantial foreign investment and the banking
system was entirely in foreign hands, playing
an important role in financing deficits and
surpluses in the Liberian balance of payments.75
Finally, to attract even more foreign capital and
to boost government revenues, Liberia
introduced the “flag of convenience” system in
1951.76
Integration via fiscal transfers was also
substantial, as Liberia benefited from
considerable aid flows. In the 1960s these
flows reached about 10% of GDP on average
per annum.77 Roughly 70% of this aid came
from the United States.78
Economic links with the US declined in the
1970s and 1980s. The US share in total trade of
goods dropped significantly, and in 1988
exports to (imports from) the US accounted for
only 18% (20%) of total exports (imports). The
same observation can be made with regard to aid
flows, which declined considerably in the
1970s and 1980s, with the US share dropping to
about 45%. As with fiscal discipline, the flow
of aid declined before the exit from
dollarisation.
From the very beginning, however, Liberia’s
economic structure was highly concentrated, as
its economy is a narrowly resource-based one
with a large subsistence agricultural sector.
Thus, there was considerable potential for
asymmetric shocks, which indeed materialised
in the early 1970s when oil prices rose
dramatically. As monetary policy was not
available as an adjustment mechanism, the
government resorted to a fiscal policy that very
soon became unsustainable. When the
government tried to implement consolidation
measures, the fragile political situation
exploded, leading not only to the de facto
dismissal of dollarisation, but to general
economic decline and civil war.
Chart 4.1 Selected African countries: inflation differential to the United States
(in percent per annum, 1966-1989)
Sources: Bruno and Easterly (1993), authors’ calculations.
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74 80% of total trade was with OECD countries.
75 BIS data reveal that at the end of 1983, claims on Liberia accounted
for 1% of all foreign claims of BIS reporting banks to developing
countries and offshore centres. Thus, Liberia ranked 30th among
roughly 200 countries and jurisdictions.
76 Of around 1,500 ships registered in Liberia in 2000, 860 were
considered to be operating under a “flag of convenience”. Liberia
also established an offshore financial centre, although, in contrast
to other dollarised/euroised countries reviewed in Section 3,
activity levels were rather low.
77 According to data provided by the OECD (2002), by this measure
of aid dependency, Liberia ranked sixth among 85 developing
countries where the respective data are available.
78 For sake of comparison, the US share in total aid to African
countries in the 1960s amounted to about 29%.39
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3 MAIN LESSONS FROM CASES OF
ABANDONMENT
The analysis seems to confirm that in the past,
close political relations with the anchor country
was the main motive for countries to opt for
dollarisation/euroisation, with the status of a
colony being historically the most relevant case.
When these political relations broke down and
former colonies became independent states, the
exchange rate regime was abandoned and
domestic currencies were introduced.
The case is somewhat different in Liberia,
which has been an independent country since
the middle of the 19th century. However, close
links with the United States prevailed until the
mid-1970s, underlined by the fact that the US
provided the largest share of the substantial aid
granted to the country and was the country’s
major trading partner. But these links became
progressively weaker over time, so that when
the economy was hit by the highly asymmetric
oil price shock, the monetary stability with
which dollarisation is associated was
undermined.
In this respect, the Liberian case can be cited in
support of the traditional view on optimum
currency areas, stressing the need for domestic
monetary policy as an adjustment instrument.
Thus, with hindsight, one could argue that
Liberia should have opted for an orderly “exit
option” from dollarisation in the mid-1970s.
However, it has to be mentioned that a currency
of one’s own would not have changed the
fundamental characteristics of Liberia’s real
economy, i.e. its more or less monolithic
structure and the skewed distribution of
income. It also would not have lessened the
need for adjustment. Finally, it is also doubtful,
given the political situation in the country,
whether domestic monetary policy would have
been used in a prudent way, i.e. facilitating the
adjustment process rather than aggravating it by
following inflationary policies. Thus, the main
lessons the Liberian case holds for other
countries is (1) that dollarisation/euroisation
does not guarantee monetary and economic
stability, and (2) that there are certain
conditions that need to be fulfilled to make
dollarisation/euroisation sustainable.40
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1 OVERVIEW OF CASES
With the end of the colonisation period, the
adoption by one country of another country’s
currency for a long time fell out of fashion. In
the late 1990s, however, this picture changed
significantly (see Table 5.1). In the Balkans,
Montenegro and Kosovo introduced the euro.
In Latin America, Ecuador and El Salvador set
out to abandon their currencies in favour of the
US dollar, while in Asia, the United Nations
Transnational Administration in East Timor
officially made the US dollar the currency to be
used for compulsory payments, effectively
dollarising the country.
5 RECENT CASES OF DOLLARISATION/
EUROISATION
In comparison with the sustained cases,
countries that have recently adopted a foreign
currency are much larger. Ecuador and El
Salvador together have a population almost as
large as the sum of all countries listed in Table
3.1. Moreover, the most recent history of
dollarisation/euroisation involves only the US
dollar and euro as the currencies adopted.
The geographical pattern resembles that of the
sustained cases, with European countries
choosing the euro and countries in the Western
Hemisphere adopting the US dollar. East Timor,
located in South-East Asia, also adopted the US
dollar.
In none of the most recent cases was
dollarisation/euroisation introduced as part of a
political process involving the anchor country.
However, Montenegro, Kosovo and East Timor
adopted the foreign currency in an immediate
post-conflict situation that was leading to
independence or a newly-defined political
status.
2 KOSOVO AND MONTENEGRO
2.1BASIC FACTS
KOSOVO
Following the end of the war of March-June
1999, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) identified the Deutsche Mark as the
preferred currency to be used in concluding
agreements and settling transactions.79 Since
2002 the economy has been fully euroised. The
Banking and Payment Authority of Kosovo
(BPK), established in November 1999, has the
objective to foster an efficient and safe payment
system, and to ensure the liquidity, solvency,
and efficient functioning of the banking system.
Additionally, the BPK regulates foreign
exchange operations, acts as a fiscal agent for
fiscal authorities, and offers custodial facilities.
MONTENEGRO
In November 1999, the Montenegrin
government unilaterally declared the Deutsche
Mark as a parallel legal tender to the Yugoslav
dinar in November 1999. In January 2001 it
became sole legal tender. Since 2002 the
economy has been fully euroised. The Central
Bank of Montenegro (CBM) has the right to set
minimum reserve requirements and is
responsible for establishing and maintaining a
sound banking sector and an efficient payment
system. It may provide liquidity through open
market operations, using excess foreign
reserves, and it has the power to regulate
foreign exchange operations and to act as an
agent of the Republic.
79 Neither European nor German authorities were involved in the
euroisation process in Montenegro or in Kosovo. There are no
agreements between the European Union or the Eurosystem and
Montenegro or Kosovo about the use of the euro as their official
currency. Moreover, there is no official link between the financial
systems of the two entities and the euro area.
Cases Population Currency adopted
Kosovo 1,900,000 Euro
Montenegro 680,000 Euro
Ecuador 12,920,000 US dollar
El Salvador 6,240,000 US dollar
East Timor 890,000 US dollar
Total 22,630,000












The economies of Kosovo and Montenegro
were an integrated part of first the former
Yugoslavia (until 1992) and then the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (until 1999). In the
1960s and 1970s, the country saw growth and
comparatively high living standards.81 At the
end of the 1980s, however, economic and
political strains increased, culminating in the
first episode of hyperinflation (Lahiri 1991).
When the country began to unravel along ethnic
lines in the early 1990s, a decade of steep
economic decline began, with GDP falling by
more than 50%. Moreover, in December 1993
and January 1994 the newly established Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia faced one of the most
extreme phases of hyperinflation in economic
history (Avramovic 1995). Once again,
subsequent reform efforts proved to be short-
lived. In 1999, when Kosovo and Montenegro
opted for euroisation, annual inflation stood at
42% (IMF 2001e).
KOSOVO
Kosovo had the lowest level of per capita
income among the former Yugoslav republics
and provinces, reaching around 30% of the
Yugoslav average in 1988 (Lampe 2000). In the
1990s, the economy exhibited further signs of
decline, when the autonomy of Kosovo within
the Republic of Serbia was suspended. The
1999 conflict caused additional destruction of
economic infrastructure, with bridges, roads
and two-thirds of all houses damaged or
destroyed (Corker, Rehm and Kostial 2001).
GDP was estimated at EUR 2 billion for 2002,
implying an income level per capita of
€1,000 per year. The structure of GDP is highly
distorted owing to the extraordinary amount of
foreign transfers. Donor assistance and local
spending by expatriates are estimated to
generate about one-fourth of value-added in the
economy, while remittances from Kosovo
Albanians working abroad represent some
25-30% of GDP (World Bank 2003b).82
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro’s growth performance followed
closely that of the former Yugoslavia. GDP per
capita was at about 75% of the country average.
The economic structure is biased toward
industry, tourism and agriculture. When
euroisation was introduced, Montenegro
showed the typical features of an economy at
the beginning of transition: its industrial sector
was dominated by state-owned enterprises, the
grey economy accounted for roughly 30% of
GDP, and the banking sector widely lacked
confidence. At end-2002, annual per capita
income was estimated at €1,800 (Economic
Reform Agenda for Montenegro 2003).
2.3OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA PROPERTIES
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
Euroisation in Kosovo and Montenegro
followed two decades of extreme monetary
instability accompanied by a high degree of
unofficial euroisation, as the Deutsche Mark
was widely used as a store of value and as a
medium of exchange.83 Thus, with euroisation,
post-war reconstruction was put on a sound
monetary footing, eschewing credibility
problems related to the former domestic
currency.84 Indeed, inflation rates declined
80 If not otherwise noted, data used in the following sections are taken
from the Kosovo Banking and Payment Authority, the Central Bank
of Montenegro and various editions of Montenegro Economic
Trends. However, as questions on the reliability of the data remain,
any conclusions should be interpreted with care.
81 In 1980, real GDP per capita in Yugoslavia ranked 42nd among 142
countries in the Penn World Tables and reached almost 50% of the
real GDP per capita of France.
82 Owing to the sizeable flows of remittances, national income is
significantly higher than GDP.
83 Whereas up to the early 1990s unofficial euroisation mainly took
the form of asset substitution, this changed after foreign currency
deposits were frozen. The euro cash changeover in January 2002
revealed the magnitude of currency substitution (BPK 2003a;
Central Bank of Montenegro 2002, 2003). Kosovo repatriated
almost DEM 1.2 billion. Moreover, the three months prior to
the cash changeover saw an increase in bank deposits by about
€300 million, as residents placed DEM holdings at banks to minimise
changeover costs and risks. Montenegro reported a changeover of
more than DEM 900 million by end-March 2002. Estimates for end-
2002 put euro cash in circulation at €440 million in Kosovo and €250
million in Montenegro.
84 See also the assessment in World Bank (2003b).42
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rapidly (see Table 5.2). In Kosovo, they have
now come close to euro area levels, whereas
Montenegro has been facing substantial
inflation differentials to the euro area.
In 2001/2002 Kosovo’s economy experienced
strong growth, based on foreign aid, private
remittances and a vibrant private service sector,
largely operating in the informal economy (IMF
2001b). Montenegro’s growth record has been
a more modest one, as the transition to a market
economy has been more gradual, both in real as
well as in institutional terms, while foreign aid,
while still significant, has not been as sizeable
as in the case of Kosovo.
Government finances in Kosovo are
characterised by sizeable budget deficits that
are almost exclusively financed by donor
support (World Bank 2003b). In Montenegro,
where the donor community covered most of the
financing gap in 2000, the government has been
increasingly able to turn to domestic sources,
mainly commercial banks. Moreover, in 2002
tight fiscal policies and privatisation revenues
led to a budget surplus (Ministry of Finance of
the Republic of Montenegro 2003). Both
entities have sizeable trade deficits that are
mainly financed by private and official
transfers.
Kosovo’s financial sector was created from
scratch after the war, with the BPK issuing
licenses to seven commercial banks. At the end
of 2002, total assets amounted to €470 million,
i.e. roughly 25% of GDP. Local deposits
represent the main source of funds, with deposit
interest rates closely following interest rate
developments in the euro area.85
Montenegro’s financial sector has developed
quite differently, as most Montenegrin
commercial banks have a history that dates back
to the socialist and post-socialist Yugoslav era.
At that time, they were mainly operating as
“pocket banks”, i.e. credit institutions owned
by or linked to businesses that at the same time
were their main customers (ISSP-CEPS; Gros
and Whyte 2000). Thus, poor governance and
bad lending to insolvent borrowers were
widespread phenomena. Since euroisation,
banking sector reform has been high on the
reform agenda.86 Nevertheless, interest rates on
loans and deposits have varied widely,
reflecting different risk profiles of banks and
their corporate customers (Central Bank of
Montenegro 2003b; Ostojiæ 2002). Finally,
short-term Montenegrin government Treasury
bills are traded at considerably higher yields
than comparable euro-denominated bills issued
by the central banks of Croatia and Slovenia,
indicating a higher solvency risk associated
with Montenegro. Moreover, interest rate
dynamics do not seem to follow those in the
euro area.
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– Factor mobility
For both entities, factor mobility is high, as a
sizeable number of Montenegrins and Kosovars
live and work abroad, mainly in the EU and
Switzerland. The economic impact of these
factor movements is large as remittances
constitute an important source of income in the
respective entities. In Kosovo, estimates put
remittances for 2002 at about €525 million,
which constitutes 25-30% of GDP (World Bank
2003b).
– Fiscal transfers
Official transfers have formed the backbone of
Kosovo’s reconstruction efforts since mid-
85 Reflecting the difficult lending environment, lending rates have
been much higher, varying from 13-15% p.a., excluding loans for
micro-enterprises (BPK 2003b).
86 For a quick overview, see Ministry of Finance (2002b).
Year 2000 2001 2002
Kosovo 10.0 11.6 3.6
Montenegro 36.1 21.8 16.8
memo: Euro area 2.1 2.3 2.3
Table 5.2 Post-euroisation inflation in
Kosovo and Montenegro
(% p.a.)
Sources: BPK, ISSP-CEPS, ECB.43
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1999. About 75% of public spending in 2000/
2001 was donor-financed (World Bank 2003b).
Support from the EU amounted to €360 million
in 2000 and 2001, making it the largest donor to
the region. In addition, some 36,000 soldiers
and about 800 civilian police officers from EU
Member States have been serving as members
of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the local
police (EC 2003a). In Montenegro, foreign aid
(including assistance by NGOs) represented
about 7.5% of GDP in 2002, down from 14% in
2001. In the 2002 government budget, foreign
aid accounted for roughly 12% of total revenues
(ISSP-CEPS).
– Product diversity
Whereas Kosovo’s economy is just in the
process of discovering its comparative
advantages, Montenegro’s export industry is
highly concentrated, with aluminium accounting
for more than 60% of total exports (ISSP-
CEPS).
– Real and financial integration
Both economies are highly open, with openness
ratios of about 75% (Kosovo) and 100%
(Montenegro). At the same time, trade balances
have been recording sizeable deficits, reaching
about 50% of GDP in Kosovo (BPK 2003a) and
35% of GDP in Montenegro (ISSP-CEPS).
These deficits are covered by donor funds,
remittances and – in the case of Montenegro –
by a surplus in the balance of services owing to
tourism revenues. Moreover, many transactions
and incomes, for example in the area of tourism,
are not registered (Stern and Drakic 2002).
Informal capital inflows, i.e. private transfers in
cash from Montenegrins living abroad, are said
to be significant as well.
Trade is still focused on the neighbouring
former Yugoslav republics, while integration
with the EU is limited. In Kosovo, just 22% of
2002 imports reported by a country breakdown
were from the EU and Switzerland, compared
with about 40% from the three neighbouring
former republics of Yugoslavia (BPK 2003a).
In Montenegro, imports from the former
Yugoslav republics accounted for roughly 45%
of total 2002 imports (ISSP-CEPS), whereas
Italy, Greece, Germany and Austria contributed
about 24%. As aluminium, Montenegro’s major
export item, is mainly exported via a Swiss
trading company, Switzerland accounted for
45% of total exports. Apart from this, Serbia
and Kosovo are major export destinations, with
a combined share of roughly 30% (ISSP-
CEPS).
Tourism is a field of integration that
Montenegro has high expectations of (Stern and
Drakic 2002). Financial integration can also be
improved. For example, foreign participation in
the banking sector has so far been negligible.87
In Kosovo, however, euro area institutions and
commercial banks have become – next to
international financial institutions – majority
shareholders of Kosovo’s two largest banks.
Moreover, Kosovo’s banks hold most of their
sizeable liquid assets as deposits in euro area
commercial banks.
3 ECUADOR AND EL SALVADOR
3.1BASIC FACTS
Ecuador dollarised in March 2000, substituting
the US dollar for its domestic currency, the
sucre.88 Since then all entities have been obliged
to maintain their legal accounting records in
USD. Moreover, the authorities have
introduced new rules in the field of banking
supervision and regulation. Commercial banks
continue to settle accounts on the books of the
central bank and hold reserve requirements at
the central bank.
El Salvador gave the US dollar legal tender
status in January 2001 in parallel to the
87 A peculiar feature of Montenegro’s financial development was the
attempt to establish an offshore banking centre. Information on this
is limited, but about 500 banks were potentially created, most of
them in 2000. In early November 2002, however, the Montenegrin
parliament removed the special status of these banks, and
subsequently their licenses were revoked by the Ministry of
Finance (World Bank 2003c).
88 Coins in denominations smaller than one dollar are issued on a
currency board basis. For details see IMF (2000c) and Beckerman
CH (2001).44
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domestic currency, the colon, which up to then
had been pegged to the US dollar.89 As from
this date, the central bank is no longer entitled
to issue domestic currency. Newly-issued
prudential regulations specify that banks have
to hold reserves in US dollars with the central
bank and are required to hold liquid assets in
proportion to their short-term obligations.
3.2PRE-DOLLARISATION ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS
Ecuador’s economy is based on oil resources
and agriculture, including fisheries. In the
1970s, when prices for natural resources were
high, the country experienced a decade of high
growth (see Table 5.3). Since then, growth rates
have declined, reflecting a series of shocks –
such as fluctuations in world oil prices and
natural disasters – as well as weak
macroeconomic policy management and
political instability (Beckerman 2001; Fischer
2001b). From 1982 to 1999 Ecuador did not
experience a single year with an inflation rate of
less than 20% p.a., and the sucre continuously
lost value against the US dollar. While budget
deficits were rather modest, the current account
showed persistent negative balances, and the
external debt rose to about 95% of GDP.
In 1998/1999, the economy was hit by three
external shocks: the weather phenomenon of El
Niño, which caused severe economic damage,
the decline in world oil prices, and the
contagion effects of the Brazilian and Russian
financial crisis (IMF 2000c). Growth collapsed,
Average Average Average
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 1999
GDP growth 9.2 2.4 1.9 -7.5
GDP per capita growth 5.8 0.2 -0.3 -9.2
Inflation 11.9 34.0 39.0 52.2
Sucre per USD 25.0 175.0 4,636 20,243
Real effective exchange rate n.a. 143.8 92.8 80.3
Government balance (as a % of GDP) -1.8 -1.5 0.5 -0.7
Current account balance (as a % of GDP) -5.3 -5.4 -3.4 6.7
External debt (as a % of GDP) 30.7 80.2 94.8 81.2
Table 5.3 Selected macroeconomic indicators – Ecuador
Sources: IMF, World Bank, authors’ calculations.
inflation soared, the currency sharply devalued
– Ecuador abandoned its crawling peg regime in
early 1999 (Fischer 2001b) in favour of an
independently floating regime – and the banking
sector faced substantial solvency and liquidity
problems.
At the end of 1999 the sucre again came under
heavy pressure in the exchange market,
depreciating from about 11,000 sucre per USD
to 24,825 sucre per USD on 11 January 2000,
and political instability ensued. Ecuadorian
authorities ultimately decided to adopt the US
dollar as the domestic currency at the fixed
conversion rate of 25,000 sucre per USD.
Following a long civil war, El Salvador’s
economic situation improved significantly in
the 1990s (see Table 5.4). Based on a strong
service sector accounting for 60% of GDP, the
economy grew at an average annual rate of
almost 5%, notwithstanding a series of natural
disasters and falling coffee prices, at that time
the major export item. Nevertheless, the country
still has one of the highest rates of inequality in
the world in terms of income distribution (EU
2003b).
Inflation slowed gradually, reaching levels of
less than 3% in the late 1990s. From 1993
onwards the exchange rate was pegged at a level
of 8.75 colones per US dollar. The government
89 For details see http://www.integracion.gob.sv/monetary_
integration_law.html45
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1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 1999
GDP growth 3.9 -1.9 4.7 2.0
GDP per capita growth 1.9 -3.5 2.4 -0.1
Inflation 9.4 18.5 10.6 0.5
Colones per USD 2.5 3.5 8.6 8.75
Government balance (as a % of GDP) -0.4 -2.8 -1.7 -2.3
Current account balance (as a % of GDP) -0.6 -1.0 -0.3 -0.2
External debt (as a % of GDP) 22.3 45.9 33.2 32.8
Table 5.4 Selected macroeconomic indicators – El Salvador
Sources: IMF, World Bank, authors’ calculations.
budget was close to balance in the mid-1990s
but recorded higher deficits in the late 1990s.
As the current account showed only modest
deficits, external debt stayed basically
unchanged at around 33% of GDP.
3.3OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA PROPERTIES
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
In the 1980s and 1990s Ecuador faced
persistently high inflation and continuous
depreciation of its currency. This period of
monetary instability was accompanied by a
strong increase in unofficial dollarisation. The
percentage of US dollar-denominated deposits
in total deposits rose rapidly from 13.3% in
1990 to 53.7% in 1999 (Beckerman 2001).90
Dollarisation of bank liabilities was followed
by dollarisation of bank assets. At the end of
1999, US dollar-denominated loans accounted
for almost two-thirds of total lending.91 Thus,
when the sucre came under pressure in 1998/99,
banks’ balance sheets weakened substantially,
with the share of non-performing loans rising to
45%.92 The authorities reacted by putting larger
insolvent banks under the newly created
Deposit Guarantee Agency, while smaller ones
were closed.93 In addition, the government
announced a one-year freeze on most deposits
in March 1999.
After adopting the US dollar, annual inflation
began to converge to US levels (see Chart 5.1),
declining from 52.2% in 1999 to 12.5% in 2002.
However, this decline was not immediate.
Rather, initially inflation increased further in
the course of 2000, partly reflecting the pass-
through of the steep depreciation in 1999 and
some price liberalisation. As a result, Ecuador
experienced a strong real exchange rate
appreciation accompanied by a severe
deterioration in the current account. The 2000
surplus of 6.6% of GDP turned into a deficit of
6.6% of GDP in 2002. Fiscal developments
were positive, mainly owing to the effect of
higher oil prices as well as to stronger non-oil
revenues associated with higher growth and
fiscal reforms.
With the move to dollarisation, liquidity
pressure on the banking sector abated. The
unfreezing of deposits in March 2000 did not
lead to massive withdrawals. By contrast,
deposits actually increased slightly in 2000, a
tendency that continued in 2001.94 Domestic
interest rates declined, but did not converge
to US levels. In particular, lending rates
remained substantially higher than those
prevailing in the US. On international capital
markets, Ecuadorian bond spreads dropped
90 At least partly, the dollarisation ratio rose mechanically after
exchange rate depreciations, as the sucre equivalent of dollar
balances increased.
91 The US dollar was also increasingly used for transaction purposes.
92 The increase in non-performing loans mainly took place in dollar-
denominated loans, whereas the quality of sucre loans did not
deteriorate significantly (Beckerman 2001).
93 By early January 2000, sixteen banks, accounting for about 65% of
the financial system’s onshore assets, had been intervened or
closed, creating fiscal costs estimated at 20% of GDP (IMF 2000c).
94 In the course of 2001, severe problems in privatising/liquidating the
two largest state-owned banks served as a reminder, however, that
the sector’s institutional weaknesses have not yet been fully
addressed.46
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Chart 5.1 Ecuador: Inflation differential to
the United States, 1999-June 2003
(in percent per annum)
Sources: IMF, authors’ calculations.
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substantially in the aftermath of dollarisation.
However, spreads did not return to pre-crisis
levels, and continue to move in line with spreads
on bonds of other emerging market debt (see Chart
5.2). In mid-2002, spreads were severely affected
by the Brazilian-induced turmoil.
El Salvador had a pre-dollarisation history of
exchange rate stability, low inflation and
unofficial dollarisation.95 Thus, post-
dollarisation macroeconomic stability gains
have been rather modest. Indeed, the
introduction of official dollarisation was mainly
motivated by the authorities’ aim to reduce
domestic interest rates, exchange rate risk and
transaction costs (IMF 2003). Accordingly, the
main effect of dollarisation in El Salvador was
felt in financial markets. Starting with the
discussion of the Law on Monetary Integration
in autumn 2000, interest rates on colon-
denominated assets converged rapidly to the
level of interest rates on US dollar-denominated
assets. Moreover, interest rates not only
declined significantly, but also started to follow
rather closely the trend set by the US federal
funds rate.96
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– Factor mobility
For Ecuador, factor mobility has increased
significantly over the last few years, as close to
500,000 Ecuadorians are said to have left the
country since 1998, mainly for Spain and the
US (Solimano 2003). In total, around 1,200,000
Ecuadorians are living abroad, i.e. 10% of the
total resident population. The number of
Salvadorans living in the United States is
estimated at more than one million (Halliday
2003, IADB 2001). Emigration peaked in
the war-torn 1980s, when about 550,000
Salvadorans left the country.
In line with these developments, remittances
rose from about USD 200 million in 1995 to an
estimated USD 1.36 billion in 2000
(approximately 10% of GDP) in Ecuador, and
to about 15% of GDP (IMF 1998), close to
USD 2 billion, in El Salvador. Both countries
are among the principal recipients of
remittances worldwide (see Chart 2.1).
– Product diversity
Ecuador’s economy depends to a large extent
on oil and agriculture, including fishing stocks.
For example, petroleum revenues account for
roughly one-third of total government revenues,
and the shares of oil and banana in Ecuador’s
total exports are 33% and 22% respectively.
Among Latin American countries, the
95 With only 8.5% of total deposits held in foreign currency, El
Salvador had one of the lowest ratios of unofficial dollarisation in
Latin America (World Bank 2000a).
96 This is in contrast to 1998/99, when interest rates on Salvadoran
financial assets denominated in colones and in US dollars did not
follow the decline in the US federal funds rate, but actually
increased.47
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UNCTAD concentration index shows a higher
value only for Venezuela.
In the past, coffee was El Salvador’s major
export item, accounting for 40% of total exports
in 1985. Since then, output from maquiladora
assembly plants has become the major export
item (32%)97, while the share of coffee in total
exports has declined to about 10%. Thus, El
Salvador’s concentration index of exports
calculated by UNCTAD dropped from 0.42 in
1990 to 0.21 in 2000.
– Integration via fiscal transfers
El Salvador has been a major  recipient of
foreign aid since the 1980s (see Table 5.8),
reflecting the country’s need for help during
and after the civil war as well as efforts by the
international community to improve the living
standards of the poor. According to OECD
(2002), the US is the major donor country,
accounting for about 70% (40%) of net official
assistance provided by OECD countries to El
Salvador in the 1980s (1990s).
– Real and financial integration
Ecuador and El Salvador have openness ratios
of close to 60%, with the US the main trading
partner for both countries, accounting for about
35% of total trade.
Tourism has not played a major role in either
country, whereas net FDI flows to Ecuador
have been running at 4 to 5% of GDP in
Ecuador over the last few years, mainly related
to investments in the oil sector. Financial
integration with the anchor country has been
somewhat stronger for El Salvador than for
Ecuador. At end-1999, however, the share of
claims of US banks in total foreign claims by
BIS reporting banks was, according to BIS
data, about 40% at end-1999 for both countries.
4 COMMON ELEMENTS AND MAIN LESSONS FROM
RECENT CASES
From an optimum currency area perspective,
recent cases of dollarisation/euroisation display
several common elements.
THE NEW OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– With the exception of El Salvador, recent
cases of dollarisation/euroisation have been
plagued by a pre-dollarisation/euroisation
history of severe monetary instability,
featuring hyperinflationary episodes, and
financial and exchange rate crises.
97 The term maquiladora was originally used to define assembly plants
along the US-Mexico border, generally owned by non-Mexican
corporations that produce finished goods for the US market based
on the import of raw materials. They depend on low-cost labour,
advantageous tariffs, and their proximity to the US. In El Salvador,
the Free Zones Law and the Export Reactivation Law, both dating
from 1990, were designed to encourage investment in maquila and
other activities typical of bonded warehouses. Firms located in
export processing zones or bonded warehouses that export 100% of
their production outside the central American market, including
drawback/assembly operations, enjoy substantial tax and
regulatory benefits. In the 1990s, the share of maquila in El
Salvador’s exports and imports increased from 13% to 32% and
from 10% to 23% respectively.
Ecuador El Salvador
Average Average Average Average Average Average
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 1999 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 1999
Trade (as a % of GDP) 49.1 49.3 57.1 62.9 65.7 51.0 54.9 61.7
Trade with the US (as a % of total trade) n.a. 43.2 37.2 34.9 n.a. 36.0 35.3 31.8
FDI (as a  % of GDP) 2.8 0.5 2.7 3.6 0.5 0.3 1.3 1.9
Aid (as a % of GDP) 1.3 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.6 8.1 4.1 1.5
Table 5.8 Selected indicators of integration – Ecuador and El Salvador
Sources: IMF, World Bank, authors’ calculations.48
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Moreover, their financial systems were
characterised by a high and increasing
degree of unofficial dollarisation/
euroisation. Thus, adopting the US dollar/
euro served the purpose of committing the
authorities to establishing sound monetary
foundations for rebuilding their economies
after civil war, political turmoil, and
financial and currency crises.
– With the exception of Ecuador, the causes of
pre-dollarisation/euroisation monetary
instability were almost exclusively domestic
ones and relatively unrelated to international
capital movements, as Kosovo and
Montenegro were not subject to international
capital flows. Given its relative stability at
home, El Salvador’s exchange rate peg was
working smoothly.
– Political considerations seem to have
influenced the decision in favour of
euroisation in Kosovo and Montenegro.
However, in contrast to the sustained cases
of dollarisation/euroisation, these
considerations were not linked to political
and economic ties with the anchor country.
Rather, they reflected the growing political
and economic disintegration within the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
– After dollarising/euroising, inflation and
interest rates declined, even if there are
differences within the group of countries
with regard to the extent these developments
took place. For example, inflation
differentials to the anchor country have
remained sizeable in the cases of
Montenegro and Ecuador. In Kosovo,
deposit rates have declined close to euro area
levels, whereas lending rates have been
much higher than in the euro area owing to
the difficult lending environment.
– It is too early to assess the impact of
dollarisation/euroisation on the fiscal and
current account sustainability of the
respective countries. Moreover, certain
country-specific factors, such as the strong
support of the donor community for Kosovo,
make it difficult to come to any general
conclusions at this juncture.
In general, the available preliminary evidence
on recent cases of dollarisation/euroisation
supports the view that this exchange rate regime
quickly leads to sizeable monetary stability
gains, reflected in low(er) inflation and interest
rates.98 It remains to be seen, however, whether
these gains will turn out be a short-term
phenomenon or whether they will be sustained.
THE OLD OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
– A high degree of factor mobility to the
respective anchor countries and substantial
flows of remittances from the anchor
countries to the dollarised/euroised countries
characterise all recent cases of dollarisation/
euroisation.
– The evidence is mixed with regard to product
concentration. Whereas the economies of
Montenegro and Ecuador are rather
concentrated, relying to a large extent on a
few key products, El Salvador has a more
diversified economy than in the past (World
Bank 2003d). Kosovo’s economy is just
emerging, by contrast, and export activity is
still negligible.
– Fiscal transfers from the international donor
community99 have played a key role in
economic developments in post-euroisation
Kosovo. Montenegro and El Salvador have
been major recipients of foreign aid as well,
albeit to a much lesser extent.
– Trade integration with the respective anchor
countries is comparatively low. Kosovo and
Montenegro are still strongly linked to the
economies of the former Yugoslav republics.
The share of the US in the total trade of El
98 Having said this, it should be noted that in the European context of
the late 1990s, comparable stabilisation gains were made by
countries with a similar history of monetary instability but which
opted for other exchange rate regimes.
99 Since the EU is by far the largest donor, it could be even argued that
these transfers are financed by the anchor country.49
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100 For example, Barro (2001) argues that the large volume of
remittances from Salvadoran workers in the United States back to
El Salvador tends to generate a high degree of co-movement of
income and output between the two countries.
Salvador and Ecuador is quite high in
comparison to most other countries in
the world (Table 2.6), but about average
when taking the Western Hemisphere as a
benchmark.
– Tourism is a rather undeveloped area of
integration with the respective anchor
countries, in stark contrast to the countries
with a long history of dollarisation/
euroisation.
– Financial integration with the respective
anchor countries is comparatively low.
Moreover, offshore finance is either non-
existent or negligible.
Thus, at the current juncture, the case for
dollarisation/euroisation, taking the perspective
of the old optimum currency area theory, is
largely built on factor mobility and the
associated flow of remittances.100 In
comparison to most of the old cases of
dollarisation/euroisation, it seems to be
unlikely that tourism and offshore finance may
serve as a powerful integration device. Fiscal
transfers have been substantial, particularly in
the case of Kosovo, but may be reduced in the
future. Thus, integration will have to follow the
more traditional roads via foreign direct
investment and – most importantly – trade. In
these categories, current levels of integration
leave much room for improvement. Thus, recent
cases of dollarisation/euroisation will provide
crucial tests for the “endogeneity thesis” in the
years to come.
To sum up, achieving domestic monetary
stability seems to have been the main economic
motive for three of the four recent cases in
opting for dollarisation/euroisation. Since then,
Kosovo, Montenegro and Ecuador have made
substantial gains in terms of monetary stability
as inflation and interest rates declined.
However, it is too early for an assessment with
regard to other macroeconomic aspects, i.e.
fiscal and current account balances. As most
traditional elements of integration with the
anchor countries are still underdeveloped, with
the possible exception of El Salvador and the
US, endogenous integration effects would be
more than welcome to assure the sustainability
of the exchange rate regime in the medium to
long run. Further progress in real and financial
integration will be of particular importance, as it
seems unlikely that transfers from the anchor
countries and the development of tourism and
offshore finance will again serve as key
mechanisms supporting the sustainability of the
exchange rate regime.50
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Recommendations in favour of unilateral
official dollarisation/euroisation have become
increasingly popular in recent years, as many
countries have struggled with financial and
exchange rate crises, and domestic monetary
policy has faced severe credibility problems.
However, these recommendations have been
largely based on theoretical arguments, as
empirical research on countries that have opted
for this exchange rate regime has been rather
limited.
Against this background, this paper has
explored the actual experience of current cases
of official dollarisation/euroisation. The
analysis focused on three groups of countries,
namely sustained cases of dollarisation/
euroisation, cases where dollarisation/
euroisation was abandoned, and recent cases of
dollarisation/euroisation. It has been organised
around a distinction made in the theoretical
literature, where macroeconomic stability
(theory on sustainable exchange rate regimes
and the “new” theory of optimum currency
areas) and integration (the “old” theory of
optimum currency areas) were identified as key
policy issues driving the success (or failure) of
dollarisation/euroisation.
The analysis can be summarised as follows:
– Country size is an important factor. Indeed,
all of the sustained cases are small countries,
many of them even microstates. Only the
recent cases involve countries with a larger
population, but even these in comparison to
most of the countries in their respective class –
i.e. emerging market economies – can still be
considered as small. The fact that almost all
cases are small does not seem to be a mere
coincidence. In political terms, small countries
may more easily accept the loss of sovereignty
in monetary policy matters. In economic terms,
the scope for an autonomous monetary policy
is limited per se, but dollarisation/euroisation
may bring benefits to small countries exactly
because it corresponds, in some respects, to
enlarging the span of their international
economic dimensions.
6 CONCLUSIONS
– Sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation
are different from recent cases in terms of
the preconditions leading to this monetary
regime.  In both sustained and also
abandoned cases, countries tended to “opt”
for dollarisation/euroisation mainly for
political reasons as they were either political
dependencies or countries closely connected
to the respective anchor country. Economic
aspects, if at all relevant, were largely related
to trade facilitation. In recent cases, by
contrast, political relations to the anchor
countries did not play a role when opting for
the adoption of the euro or the US dollar.
Rather, searching for domestic monetary
stability in an environment characterised by a
severe loss of monetary policy credibility
was a major factor determining their choice.
– Sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation
possess features that are quite different from
those of the recent cases.  As mentioned
above, sustained (and also abandoned) cases
have been characterised by smallness of size
and by close political ties – extending as far
as political dependency – with the anchor
countries. With a few exceptions, politically
independent countries opting for this
exchange rate regime are in the geographical
vicinity of the respective anchor countries.
Recent cases of dollarisation/euroisation
mainly involve countries that have been
striving for political independence and are
politically independent from their respective
anchor countries. Moreover, they are much
larger countries, but share – with the
exception of East Timor – the characteristic
of being located in the geographical vicinity
of the anchor country.
– In terms of monetary stability, sustained and
recent cases of dollarisation/euroisation are
characterised by several similarities:
– Dollarisation/euroisation has been
associated with low and stable inflation
converging to and closely linked to that of
the anchor country. Available evidence
suggests that inflation is comparatively
low in the sustained cases and has been51
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falling significantly in those countries
that have only recently adopted a foreign
currency .
– Dollarisation/euroisation does not seem
to have had a strong impact on fiscal
discipline, suggesting that it is not a
substitute or sufficient catalyst for good
overall economic policies, nor a panacea
for economic difficulties.  In many
sustained cases public budgets have
benefited from fiscal transfers by the
respective anchor countries. In the major
case of dollarisation abandonment,
Liberia, fiscal deterioration formed part of
the long road that led to the breakdown of
this regime. Finally, it is too early to
evaluate the fiscal implications of
dollarisation/euroisation in the most
recent cases.
– In terms of integration, sustained cases of
dollarisation/euroisation are special, as
substantial fiscal transfers from the anchor
countries, strong links via tourism and
offshore finance have been key features in
strengthening economic ties between
dollarised/euroised and anchor countries.
In addition to trade, they seem to have been
important mechanisms enhancing the
sustainability of the exchange rate regime.
– Most emerging market countries do not seem
to be in a position to employ the key
integration mechanisms that the sustained
cases have been relying on. This is because
the successful implementation of these
mechanisms depends to a significant extent
on certain rather exogenous conditions, i.e.
small size, strong political affiliation with
the anchor country, geographical vicinity to
the anchor country, tourist attractions, etc.
Two conclusions seem to emerge from these
findings:
First, as largely special features allowed the
sustained cases of dollarisation/euroisation to
pursue specific integration policies, applying
their experience to potential new cases is not
straightforward. Thus, irrespective of the
possible trade effects of a common currency,
the evidence suggests that adopting the US
dollar or the euro does not necessarily lead
endogenously to a level of integration with the
US or the euro area which ensures the long-term
sustainability of dollarisation/euroisation.
Rather, fiscal transfers from the anchor
countries, tourism flows and offshore finance
have been key factors behind economic
integration. Since  most emerging market
countries do not seem to be in a position to
employ these integration mechanisms, the
findings indicate that countries considering the
adoption of a foreign currency would be better
off ensuring ex ante a high degree of real and
financial integration with the anchor country.
Recommending dollarisation/euroisation to
countries irrespective of their ex ante degree of
integration with the potential anchor country
appears to carry considerable risk.
Second, as dollarisation/euroisation does not
seem to be a straightforward substitute for
integration, countries should carefully consider
the option of relying on a suitable domestic
anchor for monetary policy before opting for
unilateral dollarisation/euroisation, despite the
latter’s alleged merits as a device for achieving
macroeconomic stability.52
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